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INTRODUCTION
‘Social capital markets’ has become a popular 
phrase over recent years (Hartigan, 2006). While 
this paper will not deﬁnitively document the increase 
in its use, a simple web search of the phrase shows 
many and diverse discussions, initiatives, and 
writings addressing the topic. For the most part, 
these explorations appear to be coming in ﬁts and 
starts that have had little traction as a common set 
of concepts, in part because of limited attempts to 
link new thought and practice with previous work on 
which the ongoing discussion could build. Among 
many, this condition has created a sense not simply 
of déjà vu, but of futility: if we continually begin our 
discussions and framing efforts anew, we overlook 
possible improvements and innovations that may be 
waiting just outside our door. 
Reviewing this growing body of discussions 
allows us to:
 Assess what we might all agree are the 
fundamentals of capital market analysis.
 Outline deﬁnitively what various writers have 
identiﬁed as the central elements and challenges of 
social capital markets.
 Develop a modest overview of current initiatives 
seeking to advance innovations within this 
market in order to improve the way that capital 
meets opportunity.
 Offer an agenda for research and development of 
what might then be more accurately deﬁned as a 
social capital market.
In sum, it is time we move from fragmentation to 
function – both in terms of how we discuss this type 
of investment and how we act to address it. 
PURPOSE
We hope to see a future in which more funds ﬂow to 
investments seeking the generation of social and/or 
environmental value in conjunction with some level 
of ﬁnancial performance. As the ‘capital markets’ 
moniker would suggest, we would like to see these 
capital ﬂows be performance-based (so that funds 
advance the work of high-performance investees, 
while being less accessible to lower-performing 
and/or riskier ventures). Furthermore, we would like 
to see these investments adopt structures that more 
completely address the diverse needs and interests 
of investors and investees. Our ambition is that by 
better organizing the ideas and initiatives of the 
many individuals who have worked to frame this 
emerging market, these goals may be advanced.
The paper’s secondary goals are to help focus 
future research and praxis on efforts that build 
on the signiﬁcant body of existing work without 
unduly re-treading well-worn analytical paths. This 
paper seeks to promote an elevated discussion of 
the social capital markets, a discourse focusing on 
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high-leverage issues. The paper also invites experts 
from related academic and practical ﬁelds to engage 
in a conversation that has to this point largely been 
conducted between social sector professionals 
turning their attention to capital ﬂows and ﬁnance 
professionals placing their expertise in the service of 
social purposes.
THE STRUCTURE OF THIS PAPER
This study begins by presenting fundamental 
concepts of markets, capital markets, and social 
capital markets in order to offer a baseline framework 
that will project and facilitate this inquiry. The 
introduction to that framework presents important 
additional detail on our methods for establishing 
that analytical approach to the rest of the document. 
Based on this framework, the paper then explores 
speciﬁc aspects and issues related to the social 
capital market discourse, including highlights of 
select initiatives underway in early 2007 that seek to 
improve the functioning of this market. The inquiry 
concludes by framing several research and action 
steps to help advance the common interests of those 
concerned with this work.
PUTTING THE SOCIAL BACK IN SOCIAL 
CAPITAL MARKETS
Many people note that the very term ‘social capital’ 
is confusing when applied in a ﬁnancial markets 
or philanthropic context. For many, the term social 
capital, formulated in the ﬁelds of sociology and 
political science, and largely popularized by Robert 
D. Putnam, evokes the intangible glue that holds a 
society and its various communities together.1 By 
using the term in relation to ﬁnance, individuals 
may wonder whether it addresses funds used to 
achieve social ends or the social networks of which 
societies consist. 
Conceptual clarity on this point is critical. There 
are two forms of social capital: interactive and 
transactive. Interactive social capital is the type 
Putnam discusses. It allows individuals to come 
together in teams to work. It maintains our sense 
of being a part of a connected community. It is the 
popular concept that many ‘hear’ when the words 
‘social capital’ are used. 
Connected, yet distinct from interactive social 
capital, is transactive social capital, which speaks 
to the notion that interactive social capital allows 
communities and networks to ‘put our money 
where our mouths are.’ On a daily basis, we 
engage in ﬁnancial transactions made possible by 
our social connections and common networks. We 
send money to family over the internet, we offer 
grants and charitable gifts to others, we invest 
our money with institutions we trust. Each is an 
example of transactive social capital. 
These two forms of social capital are what 
together create the Integrated Social Capital 
Market. While the balance of this paper will focus 
on the structure and functioning of transactive 
capital mechanisms and social capital markets 
as outlined below, it is critical to recognize that 
the markets discussed in the following pages are 
a subset of this larger, Integrated social capital 
market of which all human exchange (whether 
social or ﬁnancial) is a part.2
INTRODUCTORY NOTES ON CAPITAL 
MARKET DEVELOPMENT
The reader will no doubt quickly acknowledge there 
are no ‘capital market cookbooks’ to guide us in our 
thinking or practice. Capital markets (as opposed to 
the capital exchanges discussed below) do not occur 
because a set of actors simply decide to be rational 
in their allocation of capital. Global, national, and 
regional capital markets have all evolved through 
complex interplay between governmental policy, 
private enterprise, individual entrepreneurship, and 
chance. There is no silver bullet when it comes to 
developing effective capital markets – it is more 
a question of silver buckshot, wherein a complex 
combination of policies, practices, investment 
innovations, and more all come together, learn from 
past failures, and see future opportunities to create a 
capital market.3 For this very reason, we must gather 
the best thinking and innovations with regard to 
social capital markets so that we may put our various 
efforts to the best possible uses, though it means 
there is no single ‘best outcome’ – indeed, many 
strategic efforts must proceed at once.
As we think of these concepts, it may be helpful 
to examine the evolution of capital investment 
transpiring in three different forums: 
 Speciﬁc or ad hoc deals, 
 Professionally managed funds, and 
 Increasingly organized marketplaces.
Many innovative investments are ﬁrst initiated 
on a project-by-project basis, wherein investors 
ﬁnance a particular project or exchange products 
1 Robert D.Putman, Bowling 
Alone: The Collapse and Revival of 
American Community, (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2000).
2 For an expanded discussion of 
these concepts, please see ‘The 
Nature of Returns: A Social Capital 
Markets Inquiry’(2000), at 
www.redf.org/download/other/
emerson1.pdf
3 We are not sure where this term 
originated, but the phrase ‘silver 
buckshot’ seems to have developed 
wide currency this past year or 
so. It appears in the title of a new 
paper by the Brookings Institute 
on economic development in the 
State of Maine 
(www.mdf.org/mdf/speeches/
BrookingsFinal.pdf) and was used at 
the Aspen Ideas Festival 
(www.aspentimes.
com/article/20060708/
NEWS/107080063). 
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in what could be called ad hoc deals. While 
individually ﬁnanced projects allow for creativity 
and innovation in capital structuring, the process is 
time consuming, often has limited liquidity, and is 
difﬁcult to scale. Nevertheless, such complex deals 
are the ﬁrst critical step toward understanding the 
dynamics of innovative ﬁnancing strategies and the 
capital markets in which they operate. 
After project managers and investors have 
participated in multiple ad hoc deals, through which 
they presumably learn transferable lessons about 
such ﬁnancing, the managers may then develop 
pools of capital that aggregate investors’ funds and 
allow the professional fund managers to invest in 
deals as they see ﬁt. Such investment funds appeal 
to many investors, who achieve diversiﬁcation 
across multiple deals, investment instruments, and 
asset classes – decreasing risk and increasing value 
creation. These funds also appeal to fund managers, 
who can pursue their investment strategy and deploy 
capital relatively quickly. 
As fund managers and investors learn about a 
new type of investment, they begin to standardize 
investment vehicles and management structures. 
Standardization often brings lower costs and less 
waste, which in turn may result in more investors 
moving greater amounts of capital through more 
investments. Standardized investment vehicles 
and increased capital ﬂows set the stage for 
increasingly organized marketplaces, where 
transactions become easier and cheaper to effect.
It is easy to consider organized marketplaces, 
investment funds, and individually ﬁnanced projects 
to be natural and linear successors to one another. 
Nevertheless, none of those forums for capital 
transactions is likely to supplant the others. Instead, 
the three approaches necessarily evolve in a non-
linear fashion and co-exist, with lessons garnered 
from each improving the practice of the others. By 
extension, we should recognize that movement toward 
organized social capital marketplaces will be ﬁtful and 
will not necessarily evolve in a linear fashion. 
Through the ensuing discussion of social 
capital markets, this notion of a ‘deal, fund, 
market’ evolution will help place these initiatives 
and concepts into context, regarding both their 
relationships with each other and the creation of a 
larger, more efﬁcient marketplace.
ABOUT THIS PAPER
With these opening thoughts in mind, readers 
should be aware of several other issues:
 While this document is not a deﬁnitive survey, 
it does present core ideas from many of the 
best resources available. Nevertheless, ﬁnding 
new sources among disparate documents can 
be difﬁcult. We have probably missed many 
important sources and we apologize to those 
whom we may have overlooked. We encourage 
you to forward us any papers, articles or memos 
you think may improve upon future versions of 
this document.4 
 While there may be modest exceptions, the 
boundaries of the social capital market as 
deﬁned in this paper encompass capital targeting 
organizations that pursue ﬁnancial discipline and 
social/environmental value creation. Accordingly, 
the inquiry does not address the broad arena of 
social investing, the topic of how public capital 
markets value corporate social responsibility, or a 
host of other areas related to the broad theme of 
social capital markets. Rather, this discussion is 
primarily concerned with capital made available 
to nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt enterprises attempting 
to maximize the creation of full, blended value.5 
 This paper uses the plural – social capital 
markets – because there are, multiple capital 
markets at work supplying capital to enterprises 
generating extra-ﬁnancial and ﬁnancial value.
 The reader should also recognize that in 
addition to social capital markets, this document 
addresses ‘non-proﬁt capital markets’, with 
the understanding that they are a part of the 
larger, integrated social capital market structure 
discussed above.
 Finally, we wish to acknowledge that in 
exploring the concept of social capital markets, 
reference is made to a number of papers we have 
written or co-authored. We feel we have made an 
honest effort to include the work of others. It is 
certainly not our intent to use this document to 
promote our own concepts over those of others. 
Nevertheless, we ﬁrst began writing on this 
topic in 1996 and, over the ensuing decade, 
have developed a signiﬁcant body of work on the 
subject.6 
 We encourage any future efforts to increase the 
depth of this survey and to address gaps in material 
and analysis that readers will inevitably discover.
4 The authors may be reached at 
jed.emerson@generationim.com and 
jspitzer@sunranchinstitute.org. 
5 For a complete discussion of the 
concept of blended value and how 
it relates to investment practices, 
please see www.blendedvalue.org.
6 For those interested, most of the 
papers written by Jed Emerson 
since 1996 may be found at 
www.blendedvalue.org and the 
publications page of www.redf.org.
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MAINSTREAM 
CAPITAL MARKETS 
CONCEPTS AND 
FRAMEWORK
This inquiry ﬁrst establishes a baseline discussion 
of mainstream capital markets. Many authors 
and participants in social capital markets use the 
terminology of mainstream markets and aspire to 
their functionality and efﬁciency. Thus, this paper 
will examine mainstream capital markets with an 
eye toward both demonstrating their fundamental 
attributes and presenting them in ways that will 
help social capital markets develop and grow. 
We will begin by giving our deﬁnitions of 
the key terms ‘market,’ ‘capital market,’ and 
‘exchange’ as they are used in this paper.
MARKET
The term ‘market’ has a variety of meanings across 
many contexts, but our usage follows that of Peter 
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7 Reiss’s deﬁnition frames the 
curriculum of his Stanford 
Graduate School of Business course 
– “Trading, Markets, and Exchanges” 
– which explores many market-
related strategies and has informed 
this inquiry as well.
Reiss of Stanford University Graduate School 
of Business. Reiss deﬁnes a market as a place 
(either physical or virtual) “where suppliers or 
intermediaries offer goods to buyers at negotiable 
prices or according to competitive trading 
procedures (e.g. auctions).”7 Reiss’s colleague 
John McMillan explores markets in depth in 
his book Reinventing the Bazaar (2002), which 
discusses market transactions, which in turn 
illuminate the markets where they occur:
Participation in the [market transaction] is 
voluntary; both buyer and seller are able to veto 
any deal... They are free to make decisions – to 
buy, to sell, to exert effort, to invest – that reﬂect 
their own preferences. Their choices are not 
completely free though: they are constrained by 
the extent of their resources and the rules of the 
‘marketplace’…Bargaining power between buyer 
and seller is sometimes quite unequal. Being able 
to veto any deal does convey some bargaining 
power, but not necessarily much… Competition, 
while not a deﬁning feature of a market, is usually 
present and adds to the autonomy. Competition 
curbs an individual participant’s power and, in 
most markets, prevents anyone from having a 
decisive effect on overall outcomes… A deﬁnition 
of a market transaction, then, is an exchange that 
is voluntary: each party can veto it, and (subject 
to the rules of the marketplace) each freely agrees 
to the terms. A market is a forum for carrying out 
such exchanges.8
Issues raised in McMillan’s discussion of 
market transactions – decision-making autonomy, 
the limits of freedom within markets, competition, 
and participants’ power – may prove useful in 
analyzing social capital markets. 
But McMillan’s discussion of markets does not 
necessarily explain why the term has worked its 
way so deeply into discourses nor why it has been 
offered in various forms as the solution to social 
and environmental crises. Tisdell (1974) notes: 
“Markets have been extolled by some economists 
as very efﬁcient mechanisms for allocating the 
resources of society.”9 They combine information 
and opinions from many actors and indicate where 
resources should ﬂow.
However, Tisdell warns: “Under certain 
conditions market failure occurs, market systems 
of resource allocation are inefﬁcient or unavailable 
and non-market methods such as collective or 
governmental allocation of resources may be more 
efﬁcient.”10 Markets can fail for many reasons that 
are beyond the scope of this inquiry, including 
the presence of monopolies or cartels and other 
factors that inhibit market transactions. 
Tisdell presents several causes of market 
failure that are relevant to social capital markets:
1. Non-establishment of private (or state) property 
rights when these could be enforced.
Example: A ﬁshery treated as a commons but 
harvested by commercial ﬁshing operations will 
require either non-market regulation or clearer 
property rights if it is to remain productive for the 
long-term.
2. Circumstances in which the (marginal) beneﬁt 
received by a person from an economic activity 
cannot be made dependent on his price payment 
to the supplier.
Example: An impoverished person living with 
HIV/AIDS lacks funds to pay for medications that he 
values more than does a wealthy and healthy person.
3. Circumstances in which a party causing 
damage to second parties lacks any or “adequate” 
payment to these parties [such damages are often 
called negative externalities]11
Example: An industrial plant can discharge its 
waste into the air and water freely, harming the 
communities around it. Preventing such damage 
requires regulation, more enforceable property 
rights, or both.
Market failures may be addressed through 
a variety of means. Government regulations 
can diminish monopolies or limit externalities. 
Regulation can also deﬁne property rights in 
ways that eliminate the market failures. Non-
market entities can subsidize certain resources 
(such as essential medicines) and impose quotas 
on others (the number of polluting factories, 
for example) to manage a market failure. An 
externality can become internalized through 
careful market and non-market action (as are 
air-polluting emissions under pollution cap-and-
trade regimes). The advent of new technologies 
and products (such as the micro-loan to the 
poor) can also eliminate some market failures 
8 Pages 5-6; the emphasis is in the 
source text.
9 Tisdell page. 277.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORDSAID BUSINESS SCHOOL
10 FROM FRAGMENTATION TO FUNCTION
and allow markets to work where they previously 
had not. 
Historically, foundations and nonproﬁts have 
played key roles in addressing market failures 
by subsidizing goods, providing services, and 
delivering other functions that a market cannot 
efﬁciently offer. The social capital markets 
discourse in general addresses how market forces 
may be harnessed to rectify and/or eliminate 
certain historical market failures.
CAPITAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
In many discourses, capital markets are a subset 
of ﬁnancial markets, with the rubric ‘capital 
markets’ applied to markets wherein longer-
term debt and equity are issued and traded. In 
other circumstances, discussants use the term 
as synonymous with ﬁnancial markets, referring 
to various markets where enterprises can raise 
capital and investors can trade the investment 
instruments that represent that capital (regardless 
of the instruments’ maturity). It is therefore worth 
identifying different types of capital market and 
their particular characteristics.
CHARACTERIZING CAPITAL MARKETS
Fabozzi, Modigliani, and Ferri (1994) suggest 
various ways to characterize ﬁnancial markets 
including:
 Nature of ﬁnancial claim (e.g., equity vs. debt).12
 Maturity of claim (e.g., short term vs. long term).13
 Seasoning of issuance (e.g., primary vs. 
secondary).14 
 Delivery of security (e.g., spot market   
vs. derivative).15 
 Organizational structure (e.g., auction,  
over-the-counter, or intermediated).16, 17
We would further distinguish between the 
types of entities funded by a particular capital 
market. Public capital markets (trading the 
issues of large entities), private capital markets 
(funding newer ventures or those remaining 
closely held), and nonproﬁt capital markets 
(ﬁnancing public-beneﬁt entities,or those 
exchanging transactive social capital) all differ 
dramatically from of Fabozzi, Modigliani, and 
Ferri’s criteria. 
In the deal-fund-marketplace framework, 
only the public capital markets represent a 
marketplace, while the private and social capital 
markets often (though not always) address 
capital transactions at the deal and fund level. 
Our of the literature review suggests that the 
term ‘capital markets’ is used most frequently 
to describe public markets, less frequently 
to describe private capital markets, and least 
frequently to address the social capital markets. 
THE PURPOSES OF CAPITAL MARKETS
Fabozzi, Modigliani, and Ferri (1994) identify 
three major functions of ﬁnancial markets. 
These coincide with the beneﬁts of moving from 
deals through funds to increasingly organized 
marketplaces. These concepts will be useful 
throughout this paper. 
 Price discovery: Markets can reveal the 
appropriate price of a good, which indicates how 
funds in the greater economy should and will ﬂow.
 Liquidity: Markets let investors sell investment 
instruments to other investors who value them 
more highly.
 Reduce transaction costs: Search and 
transaction costs drop as a market becomes 
established and efﬁcient.18 
Achieving each of those purposes should drive 
more capital to high-performance enterprises.
EXCHANGE (OR FINANCIAL EXCHANGE)
In this paper we use the term ‘ﬁnancial exchange’ 
to refer to speciﬁc, organized marketplaces where 
securities are bought and sold. Exchanges typically 
have rules of negotiation, trading, settlement, and 
governance; they often require participants to be 
members of the exchange to ensure integrity of 
rules and structures. Exchanges may require fairly 
uniform securities, and they often emphasize 
intermediaries and oversight entities. 
USAGE
Often ﬁnancial exchanges are referred to as 
‘markets,’ but we avoid this usage to reduce 
confusion. Usually when used in the mainstream 
context, exchanges are secondary marketplaces 
(though companies can make secondary stock 
offerings directly on the exchanges). This paper’s 
usage excludes many other deﬁnitions of ‘exchange.’
12 Typically, ﬁnancial claims are 
delineated between owners (trading 
in equity or stock) and creditors and 
borrowers (trading debt, typically in 
the form of bonds or notes). 
13 The maturity of a ﬁnancial claim 
applies to debt instruments and 
refers to the duration of a loan. 
14 In the primary market, enterprises 
and investors initiate investment and 
create the investment instruments 
that represent the transaction (e.g., 
in the primary market, a company 
may issue stock to the public, 
creating common stock that can then 
be traded). The secondary market 
allows other buyers and sellers to 
trade those ﬁnancial instruments that 
were created in the primary market.
15 Spot or cash markets trade 
in goods or securities that are 
immediately deliverable, whereas 
derivative markets trade in possible 
future delivery of goods.
 
16 Most organized markets determine 
rules for trading and exchange of 
goods. Auctions, over-the-counter, 
and intermediated mechanisms of 
exchange are all used in various 
capital markets
17 Pages 7-8.
18 Ibid Pages 6-7.
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MAINSTREAM CAPITAL MARKETS LITERATURE
In planning this paper’s analysis, we sought an 
established framework for generally analyzing 
capital markets. We examined both scholarly 
inquiries into capital markets and textbooks 
addressing the topic, but neither type offered a 
‘turn-key’ analytical framework that was suitable 
for our purposes.
Scholarly articles addressing capital markets 
typically examine a speciﬁc aspect or issue within a 
particular market. Those articles’ level of speciﬁcity 
makes them ill-suited as models for this inquiry. 
The textbooks, which themselves offer overviews 
of capital markets, gave some useful input. 
Nevertheless, most of those texts examine existing 
mainstream capital markets in considerable detail, 
discussing (for example) yields on commercial 
paper in the US. In many cases, the material 
applicable to the social capital markets discourse is 
addressed in those textbooks’ ﬁrst chapter. 
While both types of source material establish, 
discuss, and deploy economic theory, those 
theories (the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 
for example) are tuned to highly evolved and 
well-established capital markets – they do not 
immediately apply to the less-established social 
KEY CAPITAL 
MARKETS 
CONCEPTS
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capital markets. Undoubtedly, many of the 
theories discussed in the mainstream capital 
markets literature could be adapted to explain and 
analyze aspects of social capital markets, but that 
line of inquiry is beyond the scope of this paper. 
THE RESULTING FRAMEWORK
In discussing aspects of well-established 
capital markets in general, we sought causal 
characteristics (e.g. ﬁnancial intermediaries 
facilitate transactions), not consequential 
conditions (e.g. transaction costs are low, which is 
a result of several different causal characteristics).
The paper will cite several sources that 
we synthesized into the following three major 
characteristics. Combined, these features 
allow markets to be efﬁcient, liquid, and deep 
– characteristics that should help direct more 
capital (and more appropriate forms of capital) 
to enterprises that can best deploy it. We believe 
these major characteristics are necessary (though 
perhaps not sufﬁcient) to bring about the larger 
and more efﬁcient ﬂows of capital to high-
performance social investees. 
The characteristics that create a capital 
markets framework are:
1. Intermediaries and service providers facilitate 
transactions.
2. Investment vehicles are structured to meet the 
needs of investors and investees.
3. Performance data are readily available and used.
We will review each of these characteristics in turn. 
INTERMEDIARIES AND SERVICE PROVIDERS 
FACILITATE TRANSACTIONS
Buyers and sellers, entities with capital, and those 
seeking it, may not be sufﬁcient to make a market 
efﬁcient. Often third parties offer services that 
improve the quality of transactions or change the 
nature of investment vehicles. 
Exchange intermediaries – such as securities 
brokers, market-makers, exchange owners, and 
others – assist buyers and sellers in effecting 
transactions. In many marketplaces such 
intermediaries greatly improve market function. 
Financial intermediaries are fundamental in 
the evolution of ad hoc deals into investment 
funds. In public and private capital markets they 
also serve a variety of key functions. Fabozzi, 
Modigliani, and Ferri (1994) explains:
Financial intermediaries obtain funds by 
issuing ﬁnancial claims against themselves to 
market participants, and then investing those 
funds. The investments made by ﬁnancial 
intermediaries – their assets – can be in loans 
and/or securities… Financial intermediaries play 
the basic role of transforming ﬁnancial assets that 
are less desirable for a large part of the public 
into other ﬁnancial assets – their own liabilities 
– which are more widely preferred by the public.19 
Financial intermediaries can offer the risk 
management that comes from investment 
diversiﬁcation and investment syndication while 
providing economies of scale in due diligence, 
search, and transaction costs. Syndicating investors 
(bringing together multiple investors to participate 
in a single deal) and building investment portfolios 
(wherein one investor or a syndicate can own 
a speciﬁc set of investments) are crucial ways 
to mitigate risk in capital markets. Investment 
syndicates and portfolios are complementary 
for investors: syndication lowers the minimum 
investment and costs for certain deals, which 
allows investors to invest in multiple deals more 
easily. Well-constructed portfolios allow investors 
to expose their capital to speciﬁc risk-return and 
cash-ﬂow proﬁles. These features also help non-
professional investors participate in the markets 
(as mutual funds have expanded individual investor 
participation in US equity markets).
Professional service providers may lower 
transaction costs by facilitating information ﬂows, 
standardizing ﬁnancial outcome measurement, 
providing insurance, and so forth. Accountants, 
auditors, and rating agencies help market 
participants trust each other’s representations 
of value; transaction settlement ﬁrms manage 
the ‘back ofﬁce’ aspects of trades, helping 
money and ﬁnancial instruments move efﬁciently 
between participants; quotation services give 
participants up-to-date pricing information 
to inform their decisions. Many other service 
providers, including attorneys and management 
consultants, can help market participants 
improve the efﬁciency of their transactions.
Peter Reiss has noted that markets often exist 
primarily because intermediaries ﬁnd it proﬁtable 
to create and maintain the markets; they create 
value and often lower transaction costs also while 
capturing sufﬁcient value.
19 21.
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INVESTMENT VEHICLES ARE STRUCTURED TO 
MEET THE NEEDS OF INVESTORS    
AND INVESTEES
In the earliest stages – and throughout all 
stages of capital markets development – some 
transactions and investment structures will arise 
from careful negotiations between investor and 
investee. To move a signiﬁcant amount of capital 
at a low cost, investment structures often become 
relatively standardized. 
Efﬁcient capital markets typically feature a 
variety of investment vehicles, each of which can 
have a variety of structures. They include notes 
and bonds, convertible securities, common stock, 
preferred stock, rights, and warrants. Each product 
is ﬁnancially engineered to meet the needs of the 
primary seller (the company) and the buyer (the 
underwriter or investor). 
Popular investment vehicles typically 
compromise between offering uniformity across 
similar vehicles while offering the buyer and 
seller the speciﬁc characteristics they need to 
consummate the transaction. In general, when 
investment vehicles suit both investor and 
investee, investment in general is more efﬁcient 
and more prevalent.
PERFORMANCE DATA ARE READILY  
AVAILABLE AND USED
In most (if not all) efﬁcient capital markets, 
companies must adhere to speciﬁc accounting 
regimes and strict information-disclosure rules 
so that market participants can use accurate 
information. That information helps those 
markets offer price discovery, which happens 
when buyers and sellers interact to reveal the 
value of a traded good at a speciﬁc moment 
in time. Typically, companies that perform 
well and/or have the potential to perform well 
receive increased ﬁnancing at a lower cost to the 
company; those that perform poorly and those 
that perform poorly and/or have the potential to 
perform poorly receive less capital or will ﬁnd 
it more expensive to acquire. Companies that 
are unsustainable (i.e. bankrupt) may not be 
able to ﬁnd capital at any cost. If performance 
data are not available or are disregarded 
systemically, ﬁnancing does not necessarily 
follow performance, and funds are allocated  
inefﬁciently (i.e. at a low cost to underperforming 
entities and/or at a higher cost to high-
performance entities).
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Social capital markets often aim to use efﬁcient 
markets and market forces to address problems 
that were once treated as market failures. In 
certain areas, practitioners and investors may 
expect market forces to operate where market 
failures still exist. Thus it is critical to analyze 
where market systems have failed and where they 
have succeeded in replacing non-market action.
Market failures and inefﬁciencies must 
be assessed repeatedly. As the environment 
changes, certain market failures become 
mere market inefﬁciencies that market-based 
solutions may begin to mitigate. Successful 
market-oriented solutions need appropriate 
markets to supply them with capital. For 
example, microﬁnance institutions (MFIs) 
creating social value through small loans 
are developing a debt-based capital market 
particularly suited to their business. As they are 
presently constituted, private equity or venture 
capital markets would not effectively serve 
MFIs (though such ﬁnancing markets would be 
appropriate to other types of businesses, such 
as those developing clean technology). 
Practitioners and investors need trend 
analysis to understand what changes have helped 
transform market failures into market-based 
systems. Such analyses can help capital markets 
actors understand how to apply market-based 
innovations to various market failures.
As momentum behind market-oriented value 
creation builds, it becomes increasingly important 
to avoid over-extending the concepts. Wunder 
and Vargas (2005) offer one such example in the 
realm of ecosystems services. Particularly when 
working in the Global South, and with people who 
have little experience with markets functioning for 
their beneﬁt (and not at their expense), market-
oriented solutions can destroy more value than 
they create.
Diving headlong into markets is not a sufﬁcient 
way to create social and environmental value 
efﬁciently. The balance of this analysis will explain 
in part why blind adherence to markets will   
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not meet the world’s social and   
environmental challenges.
CAPITAL MARKETS: MAPS AND CONCEPTUAL 
OUTLINES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL MARKETS
Maps, by deﬁnition, are conceptual 
representations of real places. They convey 
information about the mapped places (or entities), 
and they convey information about the mapmakers 
themselves. This section discusses efforts to 
examine social capital markets from a distance, 
essentially mapping them. Articles included in 
this discussion range from those that explicitly set 
out to map the markets comprehensively, to those 
drawing large-scale conclusions about the markets 
in general. Hacibedel et al (2006) collects a wider 
range of mapping efforts and should be consulted 
for a more comprehensive list of market maps.
Most of these works have three components:
 A descriptive element, in which they deﬁne the 
boundaries of a capital market and describe the 
entities and functions therein.
 An analytical element that draws conclusions 
from the descriptive section.
 Prescriptive recommendations for action as 
suggested by the analysis.
THE DESCRIPTIVE ELEMENT
Critical to the descriptive function is a deﬁnition 
of the speciﬁc market(s) that the discourse 
examines. Some maps conﬁne their purview very 
speciﬁcally: Bernholz (2002 and 2004) examines 
the American non-proﬁt capital markets; Ninacs 
(2002) studies Canadian non-proﬁt capital 
markets; and Clark and Gaillard (2003) maps 
social and environmentally oriented private equity 
investment in the United States. Other mapping 
efforts remain deliberately broad: Emerson and 
Bonini (2003 and 2004) map elements of the 
capital markets in an even larger context; Young 
(2006) examines various trends in the UK, 
Europe, and elsewhere. 
Trade associations and key funders in speciﬁc 
capital market segments have also produced 
focused mapping efforts. The MIX Market (www.
mixmarket.org) serves as a clearing house for 
information on microﬁnance sectors and includes 
mapping tools and publications. The Community 
Development Venture Capital Alliance (CDVCA) 
regularly publishes reports on its industry that 
offer quantitative and qualitative descriptions of 
that segment of the social capital markets  
(www.cdvca.org/media/publications.php). 
Community Wealth Ventures (2000, 2001,   
and 2002) describes the changing venture   
philanthropy landscape.
While several of these pieces map key 
participants in the markets (Emerson and Bonini 
2003 and 2004, and others), as of early 2007, 
few authors had pursued a more quantitative 
approach to the state of these markets. Cooch 
and Kramer (2007) examines mission-related 
and program-related investing. This inquiry 
focuses on investments by US foundations, and 
features rigorously collected data documenting 
the size of fund ﬂows, investees receiving 
capital, investment vehicle structures, the 
proﬁle of funders, expected ﬁnancial returns on 
investment, default rates, and other quantitative 
measurements of that capital market. This 
inquiry and other ongoing initiatives (including 
efforts by The Foundation Center and other 
entities) are ﬁlling a critical hole in the 
discourse: they are helping participants move 
from anecdotal analysis toward broader, more 
systematic and data-driven analyses. Such 
quantitative mapping efforts may give investors 
an ever-better understanding of how investment 
vehicles behave, how they should be priced, and 
where market gaps remain. 
THE ANALYTICAL ELEMENT
Most mapping efforts include a level of analysis 
derived from the descriptive efforts. The Blended 
Value Map (Emerson and Bonini 2003), for 
example, presents a range of cross-cutting 
issues, including the following: appropriate 
capital, performance metrics, leadership and 
organizational development, and governmental 
policy/regulations/tax codes.
Other maps reveal market imbalances: 
Salamon (2006), for example, examines a gap in 
growth capital investment for American nonproﬁts. 
Still others assess market inefﬁciencies (such as 
Bernholz 2002 and 2004). Freundlich (2007) 
maps social capital markets entities in various 
ways that demonstrate the dynamic nature and 
evolution of the social capital markets. 
In most cases, these analyses corroborate one 
another. Rarely if ever do the mapping initiatives 
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contradict one another’s analyses. Instead, they 
may write about those issues with different 
emphasis, perspective, or vocabulary. 
THE PRESCRIPTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
Most mapping efforts feature recommendations 
for future actions. The most helpful offer concrete 
steps that can be undertaken by practitioners, 
funders, and others. Many of the sources 
addressed in the social capital markets exchange 
section of this paper also offer such detailed 
recommendations for action. 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT MAPPING EFFORTS
Of the three elements associated with 
mapping, the analytical function seems to be 
the strongest. Although well-founded analysis 
of information remains critical to careful 
prescriptions, it should not be an end in itself. 
The ﬁeld needs no more reports concluding that 
it lacks the ideal capital structures for investors 
and investees alike or that actors in the silos are 
not communicating their innovations sufﬁciently 
with one another.
On the descriptive front, it is not clear if the 
ﬁeld needs additional ‘yellow pages’ efforts like 
the one undertaken by the Blended Value Map. 
Instead, researchers would do well to invest 
in updating and keeping those sorts of efforts 
current. Xigi.net, an online collaborative commons, 
aims to build a live, multifunctional reference site 
that may serve as the next-generation blended 
value map, offering dynamically updated content 
and interactive mapping. This effort does not 
require the Herculean efforts of a research team 
to take a snapshot of the universe; instead, the 
ﬁeld itself can update the database through online 
mapping tools.
Mapping and overview research initiatives 
should redouble their efforts to deﬁne the 
boundaries of their inquiries and move toward 
increasingly quantitative market assessments. 
These characteristics will allow a wide range 
of readers to interpret the data on their own. 
Finally, prescriptions should balance an 
awareness of mainstream ﬁnancial markets with 
the uniqueness of the social capital markets the 
inquiries examine. Their prescriptions for change 
must be incremental and realistic so that other 
actors in the capital markets may undertake the 
recommendations in a way that actually improves 
the function of that market.
FINANCIAL EXCHANGE
A ﬁnancial exchange, particularly a listed stock 
exchange where brokers trade securities, is a 
clearly tangible manifestation of a capital market. 
The low transaction costs, volume of securities 
exchanged, and efﬁciency of their operations all 
serve as concrete goals for many participants 
in social capital markets. Accordingly, various 
inquiries have proposed new ﬁnancial exchanges 
for the social capital markets (see Emerson and 
Wachowicz (2000) or Hartzell (2006)   
as examples).
Some authors begin with the assertion that 
existing ﬁnancial exchanges do not adequately 
serve social capital markets. Brown (2006) 
asserts that existing equity exchanges are 
poorly suited to social-purpose businesses, and 
proposes a new market where social capital can 
change hands. Other authors note that social 
enterprises lack forums to advertise their need 
for capital. Hartigan (2006) observes that GEXSI 
– the Global Exchange for Social Investment 
– was formed to certify blended value investment 
opportunities and market them to potential 
investors. Bonbright and Proctor (2006) review 
various giving portals that facilitate investment in 
nonproﬁts. Still other discussions identify social 
capital exchanges as distant goals that are not 
yet feasible. Emerson and Wachowicz (2000) 
suggests that ongoing performance measurement 
efforts could eventually make a nonproﬁt 
ﬁnancial exchange feasible. The promise of an 
efﬁcient exchange in the future may help market 
participants build incremental infrastructure and 
tools that will eventually engender those social 
capital exchanges.
Yago (2001) offers the following progression of 
steps in the development of a robust and efﬁcient 
capital market: 
1. A structural economic change that creates a 
demand for new services [or products].
2. The creation of uniform standards for a 
commodity or security.
3. The development of legal instruments that 
provide evidence of ownership.
4.The development of informal spot markets (for 
immediate delivery) and forward markets (non-
standardized agreements for future delivery) in 
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commodities and securities, where ‘receipts’ of 
ownership are traded.
5. The emergence of securities and  
commodities exchanges.
6. The creation of organized futures markets 
(standardized contracts for future delivery on 
organized exchanges) and options markets 
(rights but not guarantees for future delivery) in 
commodities and securities.
7. The proliferation of over-the-counter markets.
Not every step of this progression will apply 
to every segment of the social capital market 
(forward and futures markets may not develop 
in the ﬁnancing of certain social enterprises, 
for example). Nevertheless, the emergence of 
exchanges does not occur until the ﬁfth stage. 
Before this ﬁfth stage are key steps that many 
segments of the social capital markets have not 
yet taken.
It may be helpful here to note that robust 
private equity capital markets in the US, Europe, 
and elsewhere exist, though they lack ﬁnancial 
exchanges. An exchange is not necessary to make 
a capital market functional – and many such 
markets are ill-suited to the creation of ﬁnancial 
exchanges. Venture capital investments, for 
example, lack clear information ﬂows, uniformity 
of investment vehicles, and other characteristics 
that would make them. 
GEXSI, Kiva.org, GlobalGiving.com, and others 
represent important strides toward marketing social 
investment and lowering the costs of ﬁnancing. 
These focused platforms are opening the ‘retail’ 
investment space (small donations and investments 
made by individuals or other entities). A further 
examination of those platforms’ strategies, and 
results would be a useful addition to the discourse.
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SOCIAL 
CAPITAL EXCHANGES
Inquiries like Brown (2006) are especially useful 
in illuminating the various barriers to launching a 
ﬁnancial exchange. While they identify a long-term 
goal (a liquid stock-exchange-like entity), they 
also identify a series of preliminary steps required 
to implement a social ﬁnancial exchange. Brown 
includes the following: 
 Develop investment intermediaries. 
 Develop new products to attract investors.
 
 Expand awareness of social purpose businesses. 
 Build standard measures of social value. 
As those necessary conditions arise, exchanges 
will follow naturally as market participants 
demand them; thus, focusing on the preliminary 
developments will be especially critical.
Wheeler (2006) distinguishes between the 
matching function of such exchanges (bringing 
buyers and sellers together at lower costs) 
and the price discovery function. He suggests 
disaggregating those goals and then working 
toward them individually. Meanwhile, discussants 
should move toward answering a series of 
questions that will help address price discovery 
and valuation issues. Wheeler asks the following 
questions, which should be a priority of the ﬁeld:
 How do we develop standards of transparency 
and reporting for organizations that focus on social 
returns? 
 How should we address in our analysis the  
clear distinctions between the different types of 
social enterprise? 
 Who is debating what represents social value 
and how it can be used for investment purposes? 
Is this a debate that leading players from the 
commercial capital markets will join?
 Why, after years of talking about it, have we 
made so little progress in reducing transaction 
costs for those looking to raise capital? 
 What role should competition play among 
providers of services on the one hand, and among 
investors on the other?
A ﬁnancial exchange does not a market  
make. Rather than presenting new social 
ﬁnancial exchanges as remedies for market 
failures, social capital exchanges should be 
considered tools to make underlying markets 
more efﬁcient – once they have worked out key 
market forces and taken the steps suggested 
by Yago. While exchanges can perform many 
wondrous functions, they require a great deal of 
existing market functionality and infrastructure.
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INTERMEDIARIES AND SERVICE PROVIDERS 
FACILITATE TRANSACTIONS
The ﬁrst section of this paper described three 
types of market intermediaries: exchange 
intermediaries, ﬁnancial intermediaries, and 
information and professional service providers.
EXCHANGE INTERMEDIARIES
The social capital markets discourse frequently 
addresses exchange intermediaries, from 
community foundations to online charitable giving 
portals to articles about the United Way (one of 
the largest charitable intermediaries in the US). 
Charitable advisors across the world also help 
philanthropic investors and potential investees 
come together for capital transactions, and 
publications like the Chronicle of Philanthropy 
report on major charitable transactions. Such 
intermediaries help lower search costs (the 
expenses for investor and investee to ﬁnd one 
another to begin negotiations or transactions) and 
in many cases handle investment reporting and 
settlement (the back-ofﬁce functions of placing 
an investment). Particularly in the philanthropic 
capital market, these intermediaries and the 
papers discussing them are too numerous to 
discuss in this forum.
INFORMATION AND PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICE PROVIDERS
The initial incarnation of GEXSI (as explained by 
Hartigan, 2006) aimed not only to lower search 
costs, it included a rating function. In a similar 
vein, many actors in the social capital markets 
advocate the advent of rating agencies for social 
capital investees. As they have in mainstream 
capital markets, external raters will lower the 
costs of due diligence and, in turn, transactions. 
The microﬁnance sector, for example, has 
developed many different rating intermediaries. 
The Rating Fund presents one overview of those 
intermediaries (www.ratingfund.org/rater_compare.
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aspx). Emerson and Spitzer (2006) summarizes 
some of the concerns about microﬁnance ratings 
ﬁrms; a richer discussion of the topic can be 
found in the microﬁnance discourse. 
In the nonproﬁt capital markets, organizations 
like GuideStar in the US make ﬁnancial and 
other information available to the public, but 
Silvergleid (2003) reports on studies indicating 
that donations do not necessarily correspond 
to organizations’ ﬁnancial circumstances. 
(Instead, donations do correlate with nonproﬁts’ 
expenditures on advertisement). Silvergleid 
continues: “In response to concerns about 
nonproﬁt accountability and the scarcity of 
information (among other factors), a handful of 
organizations has emerged to help donors navigate 
the charitable universe.”20 Such ‘watchdog’ 
organizations monitor charities’ practices and 
ﬁnances to offer a concise, relatively objective 
assessment of the organizations’ health. Based on 
several regression models, Silvergleid indicates 
that watchdog agencies appear not to have 
signiﬁcant effects on charitable contributions. 
He concludes, “it appears that any concerns 
20  Page 11.
21 Ibid, page 24.
ORGANIZATIONS EXAMINED BY 
SILVERGLEID
 BBB Wise Giving Alliance
 American Institute of Philanthropy
 Charity Navigator
 Ministry Watch
 Maryland Association of Nonproﬁts’ 
Standards for Excellence
 Charities Review Council of Minnesota
 The Philanthropy Group
 GuideStar
 SmartMoney Magazine 
 Forbes Magazine 
 Worth Magazine
about the power of watchdog agencies to shape 
contribution patterns are unwarranted. The 
ﬁndings also suggest that the much-vaunted 
‘efﬁcient social capital market’ appears to be at 
least several years off.”21 
The Economist (2006) reported on several 
professional service ﬁrms, including New 
Philanthropy Capital (a London ﬁrm offering 
the equivalent of sell-side equity analysis for 
donors to nonproﬁts), Geneva Global (a similar 
service provider examining international giving 
opportunities), Bridgespan (a nonproﬁt strategy 
consultancy serving other nonproﬁts), and 
McKinsey and Company’s nonproﬁt consulting 
practice. The article notes that the professional 
employees in ﬁrms like the New Philanthropy 
Capital and Bridgespan may expect to earn 
considerably less money than they could by 
performing similar work for mainstream capital 
markets entities. It stands to reason, then, that 
many professional service providers can expect to 
meet labor shortages and difﬁculty in recruiting 
the best talent to provide professional services 
for some aspects of the social capital markets. 
(Nevertheless, the realm of the social capital 
markets is so large and the intermediaries so 
various that it is difﬁcult to make assertions about 
the economics of such businesses.)
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES: SYNDICATION
In the social capital markets discourse, ﬁnancial 
intermediaries command signiﬁcant attention. 
Such intermediaries operate between investors 
and the ultimate investments they make, and 
those intermediaries change investment vehicles 
in ways that better suit investors, investees, or 
both. The need for syndication services has been 
articulated by multiple actors in the social capital 
markets, particularly by Ashoka (Wood, 2006). 
Our conversations with other leading entities in 
the social capital markets suggest that several are 
considering how to craft an investment or merchant 
bank for social enterprises, nonproﬁts, and other 
investable entities in the social capital markets.
In certain segments of the social capital 
markets, new investment banking intermediaries 
have arisen. Additionally, the UK’s Commission 
on Unclaimed Assets (2006) has proposed in 
general terms the formation of such a bank using 
unclaimed ﬁnancial assets as capital to fund the 
nonproﬁt ‘third sector’ in the UK. See Emerson 
and Spitzer (2006), for more information on 
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Developing World Markets, Inc. and other entities 
that are structuring and placing investments in 
microﬁnance institutions for other examples of 
this development. 
Indeed, some of the most successful 
intermediation in the social capital markets has 
transpired in the microﬁnance and community 
economic development realms. While some of these 
intermediaries are new entities formed to serve 
portions of the social capital markets, others are 
mainstream intermediaries extending their services. 
Deutsche Bank and Citibank’s involvement in major 
microﬁnance capital transactions (Emerson and 
Spitzer, 2006), and mainstream commercial banks’ 
long-running involvement in community economic 
development, both complement dedicated social 
capital intermediaries. Strandberg (June 2005) 
examines ﬁnancial institutions’ corporate social 
responsibility best practices and in a separate 
publication (May 2005) projects the future of such 
initiatives; both papers document mainstream 
ﬁnancial institutions’ movement into the social 
capital markets.
It is worth noting that these intermediaries 
are most developed in social capital market 
segments that closely resemble aspects of the 
mainstream capital markets – where mainstream 
banking practices can be adjusted and applied to 
investments that create extra-ﬁnancial value as 
well as ﬁnancial value. 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES: INVESTMENT 
PLACEMENT AND DIVERSIFICATION
Some social capital markets actors have hoped 
private banking would provide more funding to the 
social capital markets. High net-worth and ultra-
high net-worth individuals are often considered 
less risk-averse than large institutional, investors 
and, some private banking professionals’ clients 
are demanding social capital investments. 
The discourse around private banking often 
includes socially responsible investment (an 
area outside the scope of this inquiry) as well 
as social capital markets investment. Hagard 
and Knoepfel (2007) surveys private banking 
professionals and summarizes the state of such 
intermediaries. Their report segments potential 
private banking clients, offers high-level views of 
trends in private banking, and suggests why high 
net-worth individuals demand more social capital 
investments than institutional investors do. 
Diversifying intermediaries, which take pooled 
investment funds and make direct investments 
in multiple social capital markets entities, have 
arisen around microﬁnance and community 
economic development, while also moving capital 
into investments that differ signiﬁcantly from 
mainstream ﬁnancial investments. Wetland 
mitigation banks, sustainable development real 
estate funds, and carbon ﬁnance intermediaries 
are giving investors the opportunity to move from 
ﬁnancing individual deals to funds in the realm of 
environmental sustainability. (Spitzer, Emerson, 
and Harold 2007. The natural capital and 
ecosystem services discourse discuss each of these 
intermediary types has been at greater length.22 
Throughout the social capital markets 
discussion, venture philanthropy or high-
engagement philanthropy has garnered signiﬁcant 
attention for bringing intermediation typical of 
mainstream private equity markets into segments 
of the social capital markets. Letts, Ryan, and 
Grossman (1997), REDF23 (1999, Volume 2, 
Chapter 1, along with a number of related papers 
published from 1996 onward), and Community 
Wealth Ventures (200024, 2001, 2002, 2004) 
document the rise of venture philanthropy in the 
US. The venture or high-engagement philanthropy 
rubric applies to several different models for 
philanthropic intermediation: Arrillaga and Hoyt 
(2004) and Vurro (2006) offer frameworks for 
classifying venture philanthropy models and 
identifying key similarities across the models. As 
practices related to venture philanthropy gained 
popularity, so did counter-arguments such as those 
raised by Sievers (1997) and others.
Case studies of various venture philanthropy 
funds abound (and may be found in most of 
the sources cited above), from which a more 
robust venture/high-engagement philanthropy 
typology could be developed. Nevertheless, the 
discourse lacks a systematic analysis of how 
venture philanthropy has performed as an overall 
investment style or investment class. REDF (1999) 
has published accounts of its failures, which 
remains an unusual practice in the ﬁeld. Tranquada 
and Pepin (2005) project the future beneﬁts of 
venture philanthropy practice, though few sources 
have taken a data-driven look at historical blended 
value returns on such investments.
At this point in the evolution of venture/
high-engagement philanthropy – now that its 
premises, principles, and promises have been 
well-articulated – a more systematic assessments 
22 For more information on 
ecosystem services and natural 
capital see Daily and Ellison, 2002 
as well as many sources available 
through the Katoomba Group’s 
Ecosystem Marketplace, 
www.ecosystemmarketplace.com.
23 Note that REDF’s work has been 
published in the name of REDF, the 
Roberts Enterprise Development 
Fund, and the Roberts Foundation.
24 Note that this source includes 
some entities that currently are 
not typically considered venture 
philanthropy.
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of its impact seems to be in order. Like so many 
other areas of the social capital markets, analysis 
of venture philanthropy needs to move beyond the 
case study and anecdote toward more rigorous 
assessments of results and outcomes.
While the mainstream venture capital and 
private equity markets do not offer the pricing and 
reporting transparency of an organized ﬁnancial 
exchange, in the US several sources report on 
fund ﬂows through the ﬁnancial intermediaries. 
Thompson VentureXpert (Thompson Financial’s 
information clearing house for the private capital 
market) collects information from various venture 
capital partnerships before making the aggregated 
and organized information available to subscribers, 
who can learn about and analyze ﬁrms’ fundraising 
and investing. Timothy Freundlich (of Calvert 
Social Investment Foundation, Good Capital, 
and Xigi) suggests that Xigi could become the 
VentureXpert for blended value investing. 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT INTERMEDIARIES
While many intermediaries in the social capital 
markets resemble those in the mainstream capital 
markets, often the economics of social capital 
markets intermediaries differ from their mainstream 
counterparts. Typically, social capital markets deals 
are smaller, and overhead costs are markedly higher 
as a percentage of ﬁnancial returns. 
Accordingly, the market forces that gave rise 
to many mainstream intermediaries will not (yet) 
naturally drive the creation of such social capital 
markets intermediaries. Participants can identify the 
social efﬁciency of new intermediaries, but as long 
as the economics do not support their creation, the 
intermediating function will be in undersupply. At 
least to break the existing market failure, a non-
market subsidy or similar measure may be necessary 
to support certain intermediary functions.
INVESTMENT VEHICLES ARE STRUCTURED  
TO MEET THE NEEDS OF INVESTORS  
AND INVESTEES
CHARACTERIZING INVESTMENT VEHICLES
The social capital markets discourse presents 
several basic ways of mapping different investment 
structures and vehicles. Emerson (2000 and 2003) 
characterizes the ‘traditional’ conception or map 
of investment vehicles that exists on a continuum 
from “Pure Financial Market and -100% Social 
Return” to “Pure Social Market and -100% 
Financial Returns” That traditional conception 
suggests that social and ﬁnancial returns must in 
some way be exchanged for one another (a prospect 
Emerson’s work rejects). 
Other maps plot different vehicles on a 
single axis related to the investments’ deg.ree 
of risk-adjusted rate of return, including the 
F.B. Heron Foundation (2004) continuum of 
below-market-rate investments and market-rate 
investments, all of which include an unspeciﬁed 
extra-ﬁnancial value component (see Exhibit 1 
page 21). Bridges Community Ventures (quoted 
in Emerson, Freundlich, and Fruchterman, 2006) 
maps different vehicles on a continuum of high-
to-low ﬁnancial risk, adding a variety of other 
characteristics of those investment vehicles (see 
Exhibit 2 page 21). 
Other authors map investment vehicles 
on multiple dimensions. Bolton (2003) plots 
investment vehicles along two axes: commercial 
to charitable and high involvement to low 
involvement (see Exhibit 3 page 22). While the 
high-to-low involvement axis represents a true 
continuum, the other axis again implies that 
investment vehicles must sacriﬁce commercial 
for charitable returns. Emerson (2000) maps 
investment across two axes, Commercial 
Enterprise-to-Social Enterprise, and the stages 
of enterprise development (see Exhibit 4 page 
22). That conception integrates the capital 
markets reality that enterprises need different 
types of capital at different stages of their 
development. 
Notably, these maps do little to characterize 
extra-ﬁnancial returns generated by the different 
investment instruments. Nevertheless, the 
schemes do address investment dimensions 
that are characteristic of mainstream ﬁnancial 
investments (including expected ﬁnancial return, 
duration, and depth of engagement, etc.). 
The frameworks above suggest that investment 
vehicle structuring does not necessarily explicitly 
address extra-ﬁnancial value generation. 
Nevertheless, actors in the social capital markets 
are systematically seeking ways to relate ﬁnancial 
and extra-ﬁnancial returns in investment 
decisions. Aquillian Investments has articulated 
sophisticated approaches to balancing multiple 
dimensions of returns within a portfolio. The ﬁrm’s 
concepts (presented in Dunn, 2006) may be 
useful in articulating speciﬁc investment vehicles’ 
ﬁnancial and extra-ﬁnancial returns. 
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EXHIBIT 2: BRIDGES COMMUNITY VENTURES INVESTMENT CHART
EXPECTED LOSS %
RETURN    
ON INVESTMENT
TERM OF 
INVESTMENT
INVOLVEMENT   
IN BUSINESS
EXIT OF 
INVESTMENT
LIQUIDATION
RIGHTS
VOTING RIGHTS
GRANTS
100%
0
OFTEN SHORT 
PERIODS
LOW (EXCEPT VENTURE 
PHILANTHROPY)
N/A
NONE
NO
PATIENT CAPITAL
20-50%
-50%-c. 10%
REPAYMENT 
HOLIDAYS
SOME (THROUGH 
PARTNERS)
REPAYMENT
NONE/
SUBORDINATE
NO
PURE EQUITY
10-20%
NO LIMIT
UNDEFINED (DEPENDS 
ON SUCCESS)
HIGH (DEPENDS   
ON SUCCESS)
IPO, SALE, 
BUYOUT
RESIDUAL
THROUGH 
OWNERSHIP
EQUITY–LIKE
10-20%
VARIABLE UP TO 30%
5-7 YRS (THROUGH 
BOARD)
HIGH (DEPENDS   
ON SUCCESS)
ROYALTY, REPAYMENT 
OR APO
SUBORDINATE
STRUCTURED IN 
LOAN AGREEMENT
LOANS
1-8%
FIXED 5-18%
FIXED TERM
LOW
REPAYMENT
FIRST PRIORITY
NO
HIGH RISK LOW RISK
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 EXHIBIT 3: BOLTON’S TWO-AXIS INVESTMENT VEHICLE MAP
LOW ENGAGEMENT
CHARITABLE COMMERCIAL
HIGH INVOLVEMENT
Venture 
philanthropy
Venture 
capital
Traditional 
grant making
Bank 
lending
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* This diagram builds on the work of J. Gregory Dees as presented in “The Social Enterprise Spectrum: Philanthropy to Commerce,” Harvard University, 1996
EXHIBIT 4: EMERSON CAPITAL FRAMEWORK, ADAPTED FROM J. GREGORY DEES 
AN ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK*
Second stage
 Seed and 
start–up  
stage
 Initial public 
offering or 
privately held 
company
 Second round 
private equity 
investors
 Angel investors, venture 
capital ﬁrms, incubators
 Exit and/or 
sustainable 
stage
 Maximizing economic 
value
 
Maximizing socio – economic value
 
Maximizing social value
 5 years plus
  2 to 5
  years old
  0 to 2 
  years old
 Diversiﬁed funding 
base, expanded 
direct donor, and 
earned income
 Entry of public sector 
funding and second 
round donors and/ 
or foundation
 Individual donors, 
mainstream foundations,
in–kind support and volunteers
 
The “hybrid” 
enterprise space
Commercial enterprise      Social enterprise
DEVELOPMENT STAGE OF CORP     DEVELOPMENT TIME FRAME
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NONPROFIT CAPITAL: GRANTS AND  
PROGRAM-RELATED INVESTMENTS
The literature discussing grantmaking and 
structuring is extensive, and a thorough review 
of it remains beyond the scope of this inquiry. 
Readers interested in discussions of grants as 
vehicles for nonproﬁt capital may wish to review 
Kibbe, Setterber, and Wilbur (1999).
Beyond grantmaking, program-related 
investments (PRIs) have received signiﬁcant 
attention. Though PRIs are typically structured 
as below-market rate loans, they can be 
structured a variety of ways. Spitzer and 
Arrillaga (2006) offers an overview of those 
structures, a discussion of the purposes and 
uses of those investment vehicles, and an 
assessment of barriers to wider adoption. The 
source also includes a list of other resources for 
further reading. The PRI-Makers Network offers 
additional resources on structuring and managing 
effective PRIs.25 Bolton, Kingston, and Ludlow 
(2007) offer a UK perspective on structuring 
new investments in nonproﬁts, and the lessons 
learned by social investor Venturesome apply to 
investors across the nonproﬁt capital market.
STRUCTURING INVESTMENTS IN 
MICROFINANCE AND COMMUNITY  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Thanks in part to the maturity and sophistication 
of intermediaries, microﬁnance and community 
economic development institutions have drawn on 
increasingly sophisticated investment structures 
in recent years. (Meehan 2005, Emerson and 
Spitzer 2006, address innovations in microﬁnance; 
Andrews, 2001, Leibsohn 2001, Leinberger 
2001, Emerson and Spitzer 2006, and Spitzer 
and Arrillaga, 2006 discuss innovations in 
ﬁnancing community economic development.) 
Using practices established in mainstream 
structured ﬁnance – including securitization, 
tranching, credit enhancements, and other 
techniques – intermediaries have created a variety 
of investment instruments that appeal to a range 
of investors (suiting their risk/return appetites, 
offering particular mixes of anticipated ﬁnancial/
extra-ﬁnancial returns, and generating a speciﬁc 
cash ﬂows).26 
Such innovations not only increase the 
capital available to enterprises, they can also 
help investees adjust their businesses and 
capital structures in order to improve their own 
performance. Gruis and Neiboer (2006) document 
beneﬁcial changes in practice as Dutch low-
income housing providers moved from public sector 
funding toward the mainstream capital markets. 
Similarly, in the microﬁnance sector, some 
MFIs have reorganized from nonproﬁt entities 
to become for-proﬁt businesses in order to 
access new sources of capital. Revised operating 
practices and reporting necessarily follow such 
a conversion. While these techniques ﬁrst 
gained notoriety in Latin American MFIs and 
American community development, the practice 
has expanded to the housing and microﬁnance 
sectors worldwide (Emerson and Spitzer, 2006). 
Furthermore, environmental ﬁnance is also 
deploying sophisticated ﬁnancial engineering 
(Spitzer, Emerson, and Harold, 2007).
Such innovation has managed the cash ﬂows 
of social capital investments. Nevertheless, 
as extra-ﬁnancial outcome measurements and 
ﬁnancial engineering develop further, one can 
imagine investment vehicles structured to give 
investors extra-ﬁnancial returns as precisely 
predicted and reliably realized as are their 
ﬁnancial returns – while providing the investees 
with capital in the forms they need. 
FORCES DRIVING INVESTMENT   
VEHICLE INNOVATION
Several sources assert that many entities in the 
social capital markets lack ﬁnancial sophistication, 
particularly in the nonproﬁt sector (Spitzer and 
Arrillaga, 2006), in microﬁnance (Tulchin and 
Bhaskar, 2004), and across the social capital 
markets (Wheeler, 2006). Nevertheless, many 
sources demonstrate how investees can manage 
their own capital structures strategically. Miller 
(2001 and 2002) identiﬁes ways organizations can 
structure capital to drive their strategies. Clearly, 
that level of ﬁnancial sophistication preﬁgures 
carefully developed investment structures that 
truly advance nonproﬁts’ goals. As investees 
become more sophisticated about their own capital 
structures, they will increasingly drive innovation in 
investment structuring. 
Likewise, intermediaries and investors can 
bring more nuance and clarity to the task. Alter 
(2006) examines socially entrepreneurial business 
models in ways that may help in structuring 
capital to suit speciﬁc investees. Social capital 
investors must also identify their own goals and 
expectations. As many sources note, they need 
25 http://primakers.net/home
26 Securitization refers to the 
practice of pooling a variety 
of ﬁnancial obligations and 
repackaging them to create 
new securities that allow new 
parties to invest in the underlying 
ﬁnancial instruments. Tranching 
typically corresponds to a type of 
securitization that creates more 
than one new security with different 
risk-reward characteristics, each 
backed by the cash ﬂows and 
assets of the securitized ﬁnancial 
instruments. Credit enhancements 
include a variety of ways to share 
risk – typically they lower the 
cost of borrowing for an entity by 
transferring some of the default risk 
to another entity.
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to approach investment and capital structuring 
with creativity and a sense of what returns on 
investment are realistic. Emerson, Freundlich, and 
Berenbach (2004), Ethical Investment Research 
Services Foundation (2005), and Kramer and 
Cooch (2006) all indicate how investors can 
advance ﬁnancial and extra-ﬁnancial goals by 
building portfolios of different types of social 
capital markets investments and by pursuing 
different investment strategies. 
A number of sources examine foundations 
as the key investors in the social capital 
markets, and several ﬁnd the typical foundation 
model inadequate in driving capital structuring 
innovation. Bernholz (2004) examines the 
traditional foundation model and explains why 
its insulation from many market forces inhibits 
innovation. Bernholz notes that donor-advised 
funds and other investment intermediary 
models, which are by nature more responsive 
to market forces, may engender further capital 
markets innovations. Anheier and Leat (2006) 
further examine foundations’ potential to create 
value, and they suggest a variety of ways that 
foundations should act to maximize the potential 
to create value. 
GAPS IN AVAILABLE INVESTMENT VEHICLES
The maps and discussions of investment 
vehicles do not necessarily indicate the volume 
of capital moving through them – or the volume 
that could potentially move through them. 
Many authors have identiﬁed gaps in the 
transactive social capital available to investees. 
Marino (2006) notes the lack of appropriately 
structured, risk-tolerant ﬁnancing to fund 
early-stage social entrepreneurs and suggests 
that venture philanthropists might ﬁll that 
gap with risk-tolerant seed capital. Emerson, 
Freundlich, and Fruchterman (2006) identify 
a lack of risk-tolerant expansion capital for 
social enterprises (both for-proﬁt and nonproﬁt). 
Overholser (2006) identiﬁes a lack of capital 
structured with long-term horizons for enterprises 
to reach sustainability. Overholser suggests 
that ‘patient capital’ investors willing to defer 
ﬁnancial returns and measurable results may 
help nascent investments mature at appropriate 
rates. Salamon (2006) identiﬁes a similar gap 
in investment capital for American nonproﬁts, 
examining which ﬁelds of activity had the most 
signiﬁcant gaps.
FUTURE INNOVATION IN INVESTMENT VEHICLES
A few sources suggest radical new investment 
vehicles and structures. Emerson and Wachowicz 
(2000) present “the REDF Nonproﬁt Equity 
Framework” to derive an equity-like valuation for 
enterprises creating uncaptured socio-economic 
value. Emerson and Beceren (2001) combine 
structured ﬁnance tools to develop a new 
investment vehicle called the “social value note.” 
Emerson, Freundlich, and Fruchterman (2006) 
present several different potential investment 
structures that would help address the lack of 
expansion capital for social enterprises. Natural 
capital and ecosystem services have generated 
relatively new investment structures as actors in 
these markets develop compensatory mitigation 
regimens in real estate (see Emerson, Harold, 
and Spitzer 2007) and air pollution. As actors 
learn how to value certain ecosystem services, 
new transactions and investment structures will 
necessarily follow.
CONCLUSIONS ON INVESTMENT VEHICLES
The social capital markets have not lacked for 
ﬁnancial engineering innovation. Entrepreneurs, 
managers, and investors across the markets 
continue to develop new investment structures 
to solve their needs. Nevertheless, the literature 
continues to document shortages of capital in 
various segments of the markets, which suggests 
that those innovations are not being widely 
adopted. Financial engineering alone cannot ﬁll 
gaps in the capital markets. Emerson, Freundlich, 
and Fruchterman (2006) assert that investors 
and social enterprises both need to revise their 
expectations of the investment relationship: 
We need a new ‘contract,’ a new valuation 
scheme and new perspectives on the relationship 
between investor and enterprise. Simply said, we 
have often poorly articulated expectations and value 
ﬂows currently in place between the parties… Both 
parties have to ﬁgure out the central expectations 
around the often-challenging intersection of risk, 
return, and social value creation. Which metrics 
matter to whom, how are they Integrated into 
the management, why is the business and social 
impact creation best intertwined?
Emerson (2001) speciﬁcally addresses the 
relationship between foundations and nonproﬁts, 
suggesting that both need to reassess their roles in 
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investment relationships and focus on productive 
engagement with one another. He asserts that 
grantmakers should focus “less upon units of 
outcome than a pursuit of the process of value 
creation made possible through the application 
of your resources – ﬁnancial and otherwise 
– in support of the work of grantees.”27 That 
suggestion can apply to many investors in the 
social capital markets. When investors, investees, 
and intermediaries clarify their goals and roles 
in relation to one another, then the appropriate 
investment vehicles will arise with relative ease. 
Such investment structures will become more 
uniform and reﬁned through processes described 
in Spitzer, Emerson, and Harold (2007). Social 
capital markets participants can speed the 
advent of appropriate investment structures and 
relationships through transparency – indeed, they 
risk not just inefﬁciency but market failure without 
it. Emerson and Spitzer (2006) reports:
Open communication about investment 
methodologies, pricing, failures and equity-
holders’ proﬁts will be essential to pricing these 
blended value investments correctly. Keeping 
the data private introduces the chance that other 
funds will erroneously price risk. When substantial 
capital enters (or fails to enter) a market based on 
mispriced risk, that market is prone to dramatic 
failure. Markets cannot accurately price the 
risk associated with their securities unless they 
openly explore failures as well as successes…The 
emerging blended value capital markets simply 
cannot afford for participants to be secretive 
about their data, ashamed of their failures, or 
fragmented in their terminology.28 
PERFORMANCE DATA ARE READILY AVAILABLE 
AND USED
The ﬁrst section of this paper asserted the 
importance of performance data to the efﬁcient 
allocation of capital. Investors seek performance 
measurements to understand the value their 
capital can and does create. Furthermore, such 
data are critical for enterprise managers: Effective 
measurements of what constitutes ﬁnancial and 
extra-ﬁnancial return can help them understand 
which endeavors represent the best use of their 
own capital and energy. 
The social capital markets literature is rife with 
laments that those markets are not sufﬁciently 
performance-based, and that funds do not ﬂow 
more readily to high-performance investments 
than middling or poorly performing enterprises. 
Such capital allocations are inefﬁcient in 
generating extra-ﬁnancial value and they do not 
provide price signalling to other actors in the 
capital markets. While much of this hand-wringing 
comes from investors, enterprise managers 
have powerful reasons to be concerned as well. 
Effective managers want to be rewarded for 
success with the promise of less expensive and 
more abundant capital, and they should also want 
performance measurements to help them become 
more efﬁcient.
THE EFFECTS OF PERFORMANCE DATA 
Gruis and Neiboer (2006) report on operational 
improvements in social service providers that 
move toward a market-responsive, performance-
based ﬁnancing regime. In the literature, such 
examples tends to be the exception rather than 
the rule, though similar success stories can 
be found in discussions of microﬁnance and 
community economic development (Emerson and 
Spitzer, 2006). 
The absence of good performance data is well-
documented. Community Wealth Ventures (2000) 
links the lack of performance-based funding to a 
shortage of high-performance leadership among 
social enterprises and nonproﬁts. Ryan (2001) 
observes a variety of problematic knock-on effects 
from poor capital-market function, including high 
transaction costs and unnecessary duplication of 
efforts. In discussing the shortage of expansion 
capital for nonproﬁts and social enterprises, 
Bradach (2003) notes that without performance-
based ﬁnancing, many enterprises are relegated 
to an inefﬁcient scale that does not create value 
efﬁciently. Community Wealth Ventures (2004) 
recognizes success often creates demand for 
an organization’s products or services without a 
commensurate response from investors. With more 
demand and fewer resources, such organizations’ 
performance may deteriorate quickly.
WHY IS THERE A LACK OF  
PERFORMANCE DATA?
Emerson (1996) – along with other publications 
before and after – observed that the nonproﬁt 
capital markets lack good measures or ‘return’ 
and ‘proﬁt’ to assess the extra-ﬁnancial value they 
create. The deﬁciency affects many enterprises, no 
matter whether they are organized as nonproﬁts or 
27 Page 69.
27 This article is available online 
at www.foundationnews.org/CME/
article.cfm?ID=204
28 Page 69.
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as for-proﬁt businesses. Nevertheless, many actors 
in the social capital markets have attempted to 
deﬁne such extra-ﬁnancial analogs for proﬁts and 
returns on investment. 
Several authors suggest that foundations 
choosing traditional organizational and operational 
forms are not likely to develop those outcome 
measurements (Anheier and Leat, 2006 and 
Bernholz, 2004). Nevertheless, new philanthropic 
models (venture or high-engagement philanthropy 
particularly) have created much of what constitutes 
the new generation of outcome measurement 
regimes. Examples include REDF’s Social Return 
on Investment (www.redf.org) and Acumen Fund’s 
impact measurement system (www.acumenfund.org).
Many social capital markets investors will push 
for ﬁnancial performance measures. Pressures to 
adopt socially responsible investment practices 
will likely drive extra-ﬁnancial performance 
measurement as well. Kramer and Cooch (2006) 
offer a functional overview and comparison of 
several investors’ approaches to measuring the 
extra-ﬁnancial value created by their investments. 
Even after years of effort to develop extra-
ﬁnancial performance measurement regimes, 
it remains unclear that their presence would 
change the ﬂows of capital through the markets. 
Silvergleid (2003) indicates that similar tools have 
not affected charitable giving in a statistically 
signiﬁcant way. Furthermore, in the microﬁnance 
and community economic development sectors, it 
is not clear that ﬁnancing is especially tied to extra-
ﬁnancial outcomes (though fund ﬂows likely have 
correlations to enterprises’ ﬁnancial outcomes). As 
the social capital markets become more robust and 
ﬁnancially sophisticated, actors must be careful not 
to make ﬁnancing decisions based only on ﬁnancial 
performance criteria. Thus, it becomes especially 
important to develop extra-ﬁnancial performance 
measurements. While ﬁnancial and extra-
ﬁnancial performance are closely related in many 
investments, they must not be conﬂated sloppily; 
instead, various dimensions of performance should 
be separated for initial analysis and then blended 
thoughtfully to reﬂect the total return of the capital 
and venture investment.
The appendix to this paper presents a wide 
range of performance-measurement regimes that 
have been developed over the past twenty years. 
While not necessarily comprehensive, the guide 
should offer readers insight into the variety and 
breadth of those different metrics efforts. 
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CONCLUSIONS
THE DEFINITIONS AND BOUNDARIES OF   
THE SOCIAL CAPITAL MARKET MAY BE   
TOO UNCLEAR 
The sources cited in this inquiry use the phrase 
‘social capital market’ to mean many different 
things. In some cases, it refers to the markets 
supplying only nonproﬁt organizations. Other 
writers use the term in reference to speciﬁc 
ﬁnancial exchanges. In our zeal to draw lessons 
from various areas of practice and to recognize 
the common challenges of deploying capital to 
create blended value, we have built a discourse 
that covers an incredibly diverse set of actors. 
The social capital markets encompass myriad 
programmatic areas (from community economic 
development to environmental improvement 
to healthcare and beyond), span international 
borders, embrace various organizational forms 
(from nonproﬁt to for-proﬁt and collaborations 
between them), and include enterprises of 
every size at every lifecycle stage. Yet these 
diverse actors and entities often face the same 
challenges–especially in the abstract. However, 
while lessons may be transferred between all of 
them, drawing sharp conclusions about the social 
capital markets as a whole remains difﬁcult due 
to the diversity of entities, transactions, and 
individuals they encompass.
ASPECTS OF THE SOCIAL CAPITAL MARKETS 
RESEMBLE CONSUMER MARKETS 
In the United States in 2005, over three-quarters 
of the $260 billion contributed to charity came 
from individual donors (Giving USA Foundation, 
2006). Those contributions amount to a 
substantial portion of the social capital markets, 
no matter where one draws boundaries around that 
greater market. Silvergleid (2003) cites sources 
indicating that individual giving tends to have a 
stronger correlation to organizations’ marketing 
and PR efforts than to their performance. Those 
fact suggests that parts of the social capital 
markets resemble consumer markets more than 
capital markets, with cash ﬂows tied to consumer 
perception and marketing communication. 
Meehan, Kilmer, and O’Flanagan (2004) note:
Investment decisions are often based on 
things like institutional loyalty or belief in a 
cause, rather than ﬁnancial and organizational 
performance and potential social impact. The 
result is that investors give no matter whether 
nonproﬁts produce social value.29 
This investment process resembles a 
consumer’s decision to purchase an article of 
fashionable clothing – buying an image and 
29 Page 39.
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perception of quality with little regard for more 
objective measures of real quality. Conversely, 
capital markets transactions tend to be based on 
performance, regardless of the other attributes 
of the investment. Thus, asking some segments 
of the social capital markets to behave like 
institutionally driven ﬁnancial capital markets 
approaches the absurd (though it may still be an 
appropriate long-term goal). 
Meehan, Kilmer, and O’Flanagan (2004) 
report that a great majority of consumers would 
like recipients of their donations to disclose 
more information about their performance. Thus, 
introducing concepts from consumer markets to 
help actors understand social capital investments 
does not necessarily mean disregarding the goals of 
the social capital markets discourse. Appealing to 
consumer-investor/donors may inﬂuence the types 
of metrics these markets advance. Communicating 
quality and performance to individuals will likely 
differ from communicating similar concepts to 
sophisticated investment institutions. 
Even sophisticated ﬁnancial investors served 
by private banking professionals make social 
capital investment decisions for complex reasons 
that go beyond strictly rational value maximizing. 
According to Hagard and Knoepfel (2007), 
private banking clients can be “trend-driven [and 
have an] appetite for eye-catching products,” 
which helps explain their demand for social 
capital investments.30 Their report concludes 
that private banks must work to catch the eyes 
of their clients: “Institutions cannot expect a 
well-conceived [blended value investment] fund 
to become a bestseller on meritocratic grounds 
alone: new products must be accompanied by 
a marketing strategy, sales incentives, etc.” 
Further, this report on private banking explains 
other investor motivations that are not consistent 
with a demand for efﬁcient markets (including 
being less fee-sensitive than institutional 
investors). Perhaps as such investment vehicles 
become more common, these conditions   
will change.
Martin (2006) notes that ﬁnancial or market-
based innovation alone will not necessarily  
serve philanthropists: 
In short, when philanthropists look for ways 
to move beyond grantmaking, they do not only 
want to draw on the tools of investment banking to 
access a greater toolbox of ﬁnancial instruments. 
They are not merely impact-wanting beings. Their 
psyche is considerably richer. Human beings act 
toward things on the basis of the meanings that 
the things have for them. Such meaning arises 
out of social interaction. As people encounter 
things, they make and handle meanings through 
an interpretive process. Philanthropists who are 
well-disposed to supporting social entrepreneurs 
typically look for meaning as well as impact, and 
seek to express themselves as creative beings and 
search for meaning… But the truth is that many 
philanthropic support decisions will continue 
to be co-determined by philanthropists’ deeply 
personal views, preferences and experiences. It 
is this interplay between the symbolic and the 
rational dimensions of human action that makes 
philanthropy both exciting and challenging.31
Few of the sources reviewed for this study 
account for the complexity of philanthropists’ and 
social investors’ motivations, goals, and behavior.
Often philanthropists’ goals are not economic 
or market-based; instead, philanthropic actions 
are frequently based on ethical and emotional 
– not necessarily logical – forces. In many cases, 
philanthropists do not demonstrate a preference for 
efﬁcient transactions that have low costs. Instead, 
they often want to see and touch their investments, 
‘leave their mark’ on the world, create new programs, 
and so forth. Those of us who wish to see the social 
capital markets act more like the mainstream capital 
markets must remember that many other actors in 
the space have different goals. They do not want 
to act like a market and do not want a cold, logical 
approach to creating social good. 
THERE ARE WEAK LINKS IN SOCIAL CAPITAL 
MARKETS DISCOURSE
The articles and books comprising the literature 
review for this paper vary dramatically. Alex 
Nicholls observes that the discourse consists of 
three different types of inquiry:
 Academic discourse that directs economic analysis 
and theory toward understanding the current state 
and potential of the social capital markets.
 Detailed, data-laden presentations of current 
efforts undertaken within the social capital markets.
 
 The discourse of praxis, which links which 
appeals primarily to practitioners
30 Hagard and Knoepfel page 13.
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The discourse of praxis is very strong in the social 
capital markets conversation. Publications such 
as Alliance and the Stanford Social Innovation 
Review are advancing the quality and distribution 
of this type of discourse. A survey of works cited 
in this inquiry reveals an abundance of this type 
of material. The quality of praxis writings depends 
heavily on the quality of the academic discourses 
and availability of data-laden presentation of 
practices in the social capital markets. 
Returning to the works cited in this document, 
a limited number undertake detailed, data-
oriented discussions of practice. In the 1990s and 
2000s, REDF dedicated resources to publishing 
detailed accounts of investors’ and investees’ 
practices and results. Cooch and Kramer (2007) 
provide another example of this sort of data-driven 
study. Clearly, substantial resources are required 
to produce such works, and many investors and 
investees may hesitate to undertake. 
Only a handful of sources in the social capital 
markets discourse have been peer-reviewed and 
published academically. Indeed, relatively few 
– even those predating the World Wide Web – have 
been issued through publishing houses or through 
established periodicals. Instead, many have 
been sponsored, produced, and distributed by 
foundations and other institutions. 
Accordingly, the discourse largely lacks the 
quality control of peer review.31 Institutions 
with great stakes in the studies’ outcomes have 
sponsored the production and distribution of much 
of this discourse (including this paper); thus, 
many papers’ conclusions cannot be considered 
objective. With documents arising from all quarters 
– their audiences, quality, and style varying 
considerably – no genuine clearing house for the 
information exists. With no LexisNexis or Amazon.
com to aggregate this information in one virtual 
place, the market of information and ideas remains 
inefﬁcient. Indeed, this inquiry likely omits key 
sources because search costs for such information 
remain high.
Consequently, authors can and do duplicate 
each other’s efforts. That inefﬁciency makes it 
difﬁcult to identify, disseminate, and improve 
upon truly revolutionary ideas, and it slows the 
transfer of best practices. This discourse closely 
resembles the markets it discusses.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the authors’ survey of writings in this 
area, there are a number of advances that would 
help improve the ﬂow of funds to organizations 
creating both ﬁnancial and extra-ﬁnancial value: 
 Segment the new social capital markets.
 Expand the discourse to include consumer 
market research and behavioral ﬁnance.
 Engage ew actors in the discourse.
 Build a clearing house for the discourse.
 Focus on metrics.
 Reﬁne our understanding of social capital 
– both types.
SEGMENT THE SOCIAL CAPITAL MARKETS
The social capital markets, particularly under the 
rather wide-ranging treatment in this paper are 
very wide and – at least in some places – not very 
deep at all. The authors of this paper and other 
writers assert that many of the same issues cut 
across all of the markets; actors from every facet 
of the social capital markets stand to learn lessons 
from others elsewhere in the markets. 
Nevertheless, to move into the next level 
of analysis – beyond the ﬁrst chapter of capital 
markets textbooks, the social capital markets must 
be segmented better or divided into more discrete 
capital markets. That segmentation will likely bring 
increased clarity to the practices and tools of social 
investment. It will probably mean decreased usage 
of the term ‘social capital markets,’ which already 
appears to be used too loosely. Ultimately, the 
discourse may need to get much more speciﬁc and 
narrow – just like the mainstream capital markets 
discourse is – in order to make more meaningful 
assessments of the greater social capital markets.
EXPAND THE DISCOURSE TO INCLUDE 
CONSUMER MARKET RESEARCH AND 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
Traditional economic inquiry and capital market 
analysis may only take us so far in understanding 
why the social capital markets do not function 
as well as they might. The inquiry thus far 
suggests that social capital markets participants 
have complex motivations and decision-making 
processes that may not ﬁt well in traditional 
capital markets analysis (which presumes that 
31 Pages 6-7.
32 The authors humbly recognize 
that this inquiry itself may well not 
have survived a traditional peer-
review process!
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investors will make decisions according to basic 
economic assumptions). Thus, it would be 
appropriate to bring consumer markets analysis 
and behavioral economics analyses to bear on the 
social capital markets. 
Kiva is an excellent example of an institution 
that has successfully funded microﬁnance from 
both a consumer and capital markets perspective 
(www.kiva.org). Kiva gives investors key extra-
ﬁnancial performance information on their 
investments. The organization’s success has 
been remarkable: Kiva has had to continuously 
expand its MFI network to deploy ever-increasing 
capital supplied by individual social investors. 
The private company TerraPass (www.terrapass.
com) has experienced similar success in opening 
the greenhouse gas markets to consumers. 
Both enterprises (and many others like them) 
are helping individuals become social capital 
investors. As those enterprises reach larger 
and larger scales, their models may become 
increasingly relevant to the segments of the social 
capital markets funded by institutional investors.
The discourse might also examine how 
innovation in the consumer markets emerges. The 
next advances in the social capital markets may 
not arise from innovation in capital structuring 
and trading in the established, liquid capital 
markets; instead, they may arise from consumer-
facing e-commerce innovations, merchandising, 
and product management. While those changes 
may not directly address inefﬁciencies and 
market failures, they may increase capital ﬂows, 
which will eventually lead market players to 
address inefﬁciencies.
Operations ﬁnance and behavioral economics 
may help us understand the behavior of 
social capital markets. Behavioral economics 
combines “psychology and economics [and] 
investigates what happens in markets in which 
some of the agents display human limitations 
and complications” (Mullainathan and Thaler, 
2001). Where the infrastructure and tools of 
liquid markets are lacking, and where the goals 
of the market are more complicated than simple 
proﬁt-maximizing, “human limitations and 
complications” may hold great sway. 
Anheier and Leat (2006), Meehan et al 
(2004), Silvergleid (2003), and others address 
how donors do not direct their philanthropic 
capital in ways characteristic of efﬁcient capital 
markets. Emerson and Spitzer (2006) suggest the 
potential dangers that arise from poor decision-
making when blended value investors conﬂate 
ﬁnancial investment and philanthropy without 
due care and consideration. Behavioral ﬁnance 
may offer tools to manage these issues instead of 
leaving us to wring our hands over them.
ENGAGE NEW ACTORS IN THE DISCOURSE
As mentioned previously, the discussion and 
evaluation of social capital markets models, 
investment structures, and value-creation 
strategies requires the study of more objective 
third parties. The ranks of PhDs listed in this 
paper’s bibliography remain thin. The authors 
(neither of whom has a PhD) assert that actors 
outside academia can indeed make valuable 
contributions; nevertheless, the discourse needs 
further input from trained academics who can 
generate further quantitative and   
empirical information.
BUILD A CLEARING HOUSE FOR 
THE DISCOURSE
In the absence of a LexisNexis or an Amazon.com 
for this discourse, it is time to build one. Such 
an online marketplace of ideas could facilitate 
publishing, distributing, cross-referencing, and 
controlling quality” for full parallel construction. 
Inspiring technology and tools abound, including 
music download services, peer-to-peer networks, 
purchase recommendation engines, and other e-
commerce models. 
FOCUS ON METRICS
Without extra-ﬁnancial performance 
measurement, social capital markets cannot be 
truly performance-based. Developing new metrics 
– measuring things that people once thought 
were uncountable – is a manageable challenge 
in which logic and science can solve problems. 
In turn, those metrics will allow market forces 
to begin working in places where they had 
previously failed. Those forces can then guide 
the shape of investment vehicles, the rise of 
intermediaries, and the nature of social capital 
exchanges (just as market forces have done in 
the mainstream markets). 
Focusing on metrics forces actors to think 
critically about value and to interrogate the 
relationships between investor and investee. 
Shaping those metrics will help investors 
understand what kinds of investments they truly 
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seek. Metrics will also push investees to demand 
suitable behavior from their investors. Creating 
effective metrics that truly represent value and 
remain useful to all parties will require multiple 
conversations between intermediaries, investors, 
investees, and interested third parties. Focusing 
on metrics creates interactive social capital and 
ensures that the transactive capital will remain 
true to its interactive roots.
REFINE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIAL 
CAPITAL – BOTH TYPES
Most contributions to the social capital markets 
discourse (and, hence, much of this paper) 
focuson ﬁnancial engineering, market analysis, 
and economic principles – that is, the discussion 
has focused on transactive capital, which may 
be exchanged, priced, and managed by markets. 
Nevertheless, transactive capital represents 
people’s interactive social capital, the relationships 
and values that underlie our transactions (Emerson 
2000 and 2003). In segments of the market 
where ﬁnancial engineering and development of 
transactive capital are relatively advanced, a focus 
on interactive capital will help deﬁne investor-
investee relationships and appropriate performance 
metrics. Without the focus on both types of capital, 
ﬁnancial innovation may blindly drive activity 
toward mainstream ﬁnancial capital models, 
creating a functional market that does not generate 
extra-ﬁnancial value efﬁciently. Interactive capital, 
the kind that gets developed in ad hoc deals 
negotiated face-to-face, must be developed before 
and while the markets create more sophisticated 
ﬁnancial products, launch high-leverage 
intermediaries, or otherwise ape the deliberately 
impersonal mainstream capital markets.
It is not apparent that social capital investors 
want the sterile, impersonal efﬁciency of the 
mainstream capital markets. In many cases, 
foundations and philanthropists invest in new and 
unique projects requiring signiﬁcant managerial 
overhead, or investments that touch a particular 
aspect of the world near to their hearts, or a 
project promising to bear their name and legacy. 
In other words, they invest like people with 
emotions, ethics, pride, and ambition – not 
like purely logical and mathematically sound 
computers. Here again the example of Kiva.org 
may be especially relevant: it allows individuals 
to invest with relatively low transaction costs 
while keeping them personally engaged in the 
investments they make. It uses technology to 
link individuals’ transactive social capital to their 
interactive social capital. 
While these conclusions and recommendations 
will not solve the challenge of connecting capital 
with investment opportunities, by building upon 
the many writings and ideas presently being 
advanced across this broad ﬁeld of work we 
may each be more successful in pursuing the 
individual goals we seek to attain. 
PROFILES
KIVA
Kiva is the ﬁrst microlending 
website designed to provide 
individuals with the ability to 
connect with and make personal 
loans to small businesses in 
developing countries. Founded 
in 2004 by Matthew and Jessica 
Flannery, Kiva’s goal is to reduce 
poverty in developing countries 
by giving entrepreneurs the ability 
to build their businesses through 
ﬂexible loans with 6-to 12-month 
terms. Kiva allows individuals to 
act as ‘micro-venture capitalists’ 
by loaning directly to entrepreneurs 
with feasible business plans. Kiva 
is headquartered in Palo Alto, 
California. 
For more information about Kiva, 
please visit www.kiva.org.
Source: Kiva.org. 
THE ETHICAL PROPERTY 
COMPANY PLC
The Ethical Property Company 
PLC, with headquarters in 
Oxford, UK, is another striking 
intermediary bringing a blended-
value focus to transactive and 
interactive social capital. Ethical 
Property owns commercial real 
estate and lets space to social-
change organizations in facilities 
across the UK. Ethical Property’s 
tenants cross sector boundaries 
and include enterprises from a 
great range of programmatic focus 
areas. Each of the company’s 
centers is has a focus, allowing 
tenants to interact and build 
relevant social capital, while the 
centralized ownership helps Ethical 
Property manage its environmental 
impact. The company has offered 
shares to the public, which is 
ﬁnancing its expansion across 
the UK. In its annual reports, 
Ethical Property presents detailed 
ﬁnancial information as well as 
extensive assessment of its social 
and environmental performance. 
The Ethical Property Company 
uses sound ﬁnancial management 
to create value efﬁciently, while it 
has a business model and offers a 
service that fundamentally aims to 
create blended value.
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OVERVIEWS OF VARIOUS METHODOLOGIES
The Center for Effective Philanthropy, Toward 
a Common Language: Listening to Foundation 
CEOs and Other Experts Talk about Performance 
Measurement in Philanthropy. February 2002, 
www.effectivephilanthropy.org
(20 June 2004). 
 Explains the need for improved foundation 
performance benchmarking
 May be helpful in deﬁning parameters of 
foundation performance regime
 Presents the general state of the art without 
offering details or how-to information
Clark, C, et al Double Bottom Line Project 
Report: Assessing Social Impact in Double 
Bottom Line Ventures: Methods Catalogue, 
January 2004, www.riseproject.org/DBL_
Methods_Catalog.pdf. (20 June 2004).
 Functional and informative comparative overview 
of several state-of-the-art measurement efforts 
 Useful across sectors, though it applies directly 
to social enterprises and the organizations 
funding and supporting them
 Very concise (two page discussion of  
each measurement technique can be cursory  
and oversimpliﬁed)
METRICS ANNOTATED 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX
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Dugger, C, World Bank Challenged: Are Poor 
Really Helped?, New York Times, 28 July 2004.
 Movement within and outside the organization 
to increase the statistically valid outcome 
measurements
 Discusses dangers and controversies associated 
with evaluation: very similar to those in other sectors
Emerson, J and Bonini, S, The Blended Value 
Map, October 2003, www.blendedvalue.org  
5 August 2004.
 The “Measurement and Performance Metrics” 
chapter (pages 77-92) offers substantial context 
for the state of performance measurement in the 
blended value universe
 That section, plus the map’s annotated 
bibliography (also available at www.blendedvalue.
org) provided many of the references in this 
bibliography
 The measurement chapter provides an 
introduction to the topic and can provide some 
direction for further inquiry
Morley, E, Vinson, E and Hatry, HP. Outcome 
Measurement in Nonproﬁt Organizations: 
Current Practices and Recommendations, The 
Independent Sector and the Urban Institute, 
2001. 
www.independentsector.org
20 June 2004).
 Introduction to a longer report available for 
purchase via website 
 The audience seems to be nonproﬁt executives 
with limited experience in statistics and evaluation
Olsen, S and Nicholls, J, A Framework for 
Approaches to SROI, Prepublication draft dated 
March 2005, Presented at the Haas Social 
Metrics Conference. 
 Examines different measurement regimes 
across a spectrum of activities developed in the 
document’s SROI Framework
 Establishes 10 key principles for an SROI regime
 Useful for organizations that are establishing 
an SROI system – demonstrates the framework 
with examples of existing SROI systems
 Includes a timeline of SROI analysis and 
additional resources
The Rockefeller Foundation and the Goldman Sachs 
Foundation, Social Impact Assessment: A Discussion 
among Grantmakers, March 2003. www.riseproject.
org/Social%20Impact%20Assessment.pdf
20 June 2004.
 Intro includes a “state of the ﬁeld”
 Case studies of REDF (OASIS), New Proﬁt,  
Inc, Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, & Coastal 
Enterprises (each rather basic but useful  
general guidance)
 Useful overview of the challenges facing the ﬁeld
Rockoff, M, Measuring the Performance of 
Nonproﬁt Social Services Organizations: 
Start by Cataloging Terms, Clark, Rockoff and 
Associates, January 2001.
 Sponsored by the Urban Institute
 Concludes that many performance 
measurement schemes are speciﬁc to the 
organization that created them and address an 
organizational level (not programmatic level)
 Advocates creating a comprehensive dictionary 
for measurement terms
 Offers a survey and short case studies of 
measurement approaches and concepts
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Sawhill, J and Williamson, D, Measure What 
Matters in Nonproﬁts, McKinsey Quarterly, 2001, 
No 2.
 Uses basic examples to illustrate key principles 
and approaches to measurement
 Stresses appropriate scale and scope of 
nonproﬁts’ measurement schemes
The United Way of America, Outcome 
Measurement Resource Network: Resource Library. 
http://national.unitedway.org/outcomes/library/
pgmomres.cfm. (20 June 2004).
 Online bibliography, divided into two 
categories: Concepts, Theories, Issues, and Case 
Studies; and Strategies, Tools, and Methods
 Many resources are general, and many look like 
speciﬁc discussions of established evaluation 
frameworks
 Appears to be aimed at one-off program 
evaluation design, rather than toward ongoing 
performance measurement
Walker Information, Inc, Measuring the Business 
Value of Corporate Philanthropy: Research Report 
Executive Summary. October 2000. 
www.measuringphilanthropy.com/docs/summary.pdf. 
20 June 2004.
 Executive summary of a longer study 
 Coarse measurement of the beneﬁts of corporate 
philanthropy; looks at stakeholder attitudes
World Economic Forum Global Leaders Tomorrow 
Benchmarking Philanthropy Report. January 
2003, Philanthropy Measures Up.
www.hidaryfoundation.org/downloads/report.pdf. 
20 June 2004
 Reviews and explores methodologies that are 
explained and presented in other primary sources 
in this bibliography (e.g. REDF SROI)
 Useful as a “lay of the land” document before 
pursuing the detailed sources 
 The tables in the report are useful for 
comparing measurement regimens
Kramer, M, Measuring Innovation: Evaluation in 
the Field of Social Entrepreneurship, Foundation 
Strategy Group and the Skoll Foundation,  
April 2005.
 Focused on social entrepreneurship and 
foundations that fund them
 Examines types of measurement scheme (e.g. 
“measuring progress against self-determined 
goals” and “estimating economic beneﬁts 
and ﬁnancial leverage”) and other parameters 
of measurement schemes (e.g. “conducting 
evaluation before the grant” and “tracking stages 
of organizational development and growth”)
 Examines several case studies and elucidates 
advantages and disadvantages associated with 
each scheme
 Concludes that measurement schemes must 
translate into management direction
 Includes some evaluation materials and a good 
bibliography
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Kramer, M and Cooch, S. Investing for Impact: 
Managing and Measuring Proactive Social 
Investments, Foundation Strategy Group for the 
Shell Foundation, January 2006.
 Primarily addresses ﬁnancial investments intended 
to generate value in other dimensions as well (which 
it terms “Proactive Social Investments”)
 Discusses portfolio construction and 
management for multiple dimensions of return – 
begins with foundations, and funds’ motivations 
for engaging in such investments
 Ties portfolio management to performance 
measurement 
 Provides several case studies about portfolios, 
vehicles, and performance metrics
 Offers clear and useful framework for 
considering many different impact- 
measurement regimes
CASE STUDIES AND EXAMPLES
Bonbright, D. The Keystone Method, Keystone 
Accountability, London: Undated.
 Document outlines the evaluation process that 
Keystone distributes to other clients
 A process for establishing outcome 
measurement systems and then applying them
 Attentive to the “ecosystem” in which 
organizations exist
 Helps reﬁne an organization’s theory of change
Bonini, S with Meehan III, WF, Acumen Fund, 
Stanford Graduate School of Business case 
study. Stanford University: Stanford, CA, 2002.
 A relatively small portion of the case study is 
devoted to outcome measurement strategies   
and tools
 The exhibits of the scorecards are useful
 Demonstrates the connection/alignment 
between mission/business strategy and 
measurement system
Carlson, NF, Making Evaluation Work: Youth 
Development Fund Learning Series #2, The Edna 
McConnell Clark Foundation.
www.emcf.org/pdf/ls2_makingevalwork.pdf
20 June 2004.
 Fairly general notes on how EMCF’s new 
theory of change (fewer, focused grants to more 
sophisticated grantees) drove EMCF to use 
measurement/evaluation
 Appendices are useful for evaluating potential 
grantees (a due diligence template/rubric), 
and as a rubric for levels of organizational 
effectiveness
The Center for Effective Philanthropy, Indicators 
of Effectiveness: Understanding and Improving 
Foundation Performance, August 2002.
www.effectivephilanthropy.com/images/pdfs/indic
atorsofeffectiveness.pdf
20 June 2004.
 Explores the dimensions of performance that 
foundation might begin to measure 
 Will be useful in preparing foundation impact 
measurement
 First experiment in benchmarking; projects the 
study into the future and discusses limitations
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Chou, A, et al Gordon and Betty Moore 
Foundation Greater Accountability for Outcomes 
in the Nonproﬁt Sector, Stanford Graduate 
School of Business case study, version A, 
Stanford University: Stanford, CA, 2003.
 Only a portion of the case study is about 
performance measurement
 General info on approaching a complex, 
ambiguous measurement task
 Basic (ﬁll-in-the-blanks) “outcomes/indicators” 
chart for pulling apart a complex   
proposed impact
Daub, M, Women’s Initiative Measures Up: 
A Report on the Post-Training Outcomes for 
Microenterprise Training Participants from 1999-
2002, San Francisco: Women’s Initiative for 
Self-Employment, April 2004.
 A comprehensive outcome evaluation and 
discussion of one program’s outcomes
 Addresses many different outcome indicators
The Roberts Enterprise Development Fund, SROI 
Methodology, 2001. www.redf.org
20 June 2004
 Remains state of the art for tracking socio-
economic value created (though REDF does not 
use it now)
 Complicated; uses DCF and other basic 
corporate ﬁnance tools to advance the concept 
of ‘investment philanthropy’ in favor of 
‘transactional philanthropy’
 Introduction, conclusion, self-evaluation, etc 
make it more than just a methodology paper
Gair, C, A Report from the Good Ship SROI, 
The Roberts Enterprise Development Fund: San 
Francisco, 2002. 
www.redf.org/download/sroi/goodshipsroi.doc
30 July 2004).p
 A review and re-presentation of SROI
 The ﬁrst 9.5 pages review and copy sections 
from the SROI methodology publication (this is 
a good introduction for someone who does not 
want to read the whole SROI methodology paper)
 Offers detailed critique of the SROI framework 
and asks questions about how to overcome  
those problems
REDF, An Information OASIS, San Francisco, The 
Roberts Enterprise Development Fund: 2002. 
www.redf.org/download/other/oasis.pdf
30 July 2004.
 Explains the process and product of REDF’s 
social management information system
 Developed out of the work to create REDF’s 
SROI
 Multidimensional performance feedback across 
an organization (a wider, less reductive approach 
to performance measurement than the SROI 
methodology)
 Outlines the problems with existing 
performance measurement schemes and presents 
the stages of developing a system similar   
to OASIS
 Presents lessons learned and templates/
guidance for other organizations to pursue  
similar systems
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Hunter, DEK, and Williams Kaye, J, 
Mainstreaming Evaluation: Evaluation as a 
Core Element of Institution Building at the 
Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, The Edna 
McConnell Clark Foundation. December 2001.
www.emcf.org/pdf/eval_mainstreamingevaluation.pdf
20 June 2004
 ‘Mainstreaming’ = making it central and 
fundamental to the business of the foundation
Kaplan, RS, Strategic Performance and 
Management in Nonproﬁt Organizations, 
Nonproﬁt Management & Leadership, Spring 
2001, pp371-386.
 Kaplan is the founder of the Balanced 
Scorecard founder
 Provides basic info on adapting the Balanced 
Scorecard to an NPO
 Includes short case studies 
National Committee for International 
Cooperation and Sustainable Development of 
the Netherlands, Measuring the Contribution of 
Civil Society and the Private Sector to Achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals, www.
businessdevelopment.nl 
November 2005. 
 An assessment of one corporation and one 
NGO’s contributions to meeting each of the UN’s 
Millennium Development Goals
 Presented as example methodologies that could 
be adapted to other enterprises
 Measures input and effort without 
assessing impact
 Indicates that data produced are useful 
for comparing enterprises within their own 
sector and offers recommendations for future 
reﬁnement of the methods
 Similar to CSR or SRI scoring systems, but is 
based on speciﬁc goals
Sawhill, JC, and Williamson, D, Mission 
Impossible? Measuring Success in Nonproﬁt 
Organizations, Nonproﬁt Management & 
Leadership, Spring 2001, pp353-370.
 Discusses the Nature Conservancy’s adoption  
of a measurement framework (similar to a 
balanced scorecard)
 Presents the Nature Conservancy’s “Mission-
Activities-Capacity” framework
 Offers four sensible conclusions about 
evaluation systems; clear and concise 
Seedco, Performance Measurement and 
Management, www.seedco.org
20 June 2004.
 Seedco = Structured Employment Economic 
Development Corporation, “a national [US] 
community development operating intermediary”; 
offers social entrepreneurship support 
(publications etc.); not nationwide
 Site outlines a “technical assistance process” 
(a four-session consulting arrangement) that 
helps social sector organizations determine, 
measure, and understand outcomes
 The consultants develop a logic model and then 
plans program evaluation strategies
Goldberg, N, Measuring the Impact of 
Microﬁnance: Taking Stock of What We Know, 
Washington, DC: Grameen Foundation  
USA, 2005.
 Surveys a variety of impact assessments   
of microﬁnance
 Critiques and interprets various studies   
of impact
 Discusses various studies’ ﬁndings about 
several different dimensions of value created.
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GUIDES AND WORKBOOKS
Aspen Institute Workforce Strategies Initiative, 
Business Value Assessment for Workforce 
Development Organizations: Handbook, 
Documenting Demand Side Outcomes Project, 
October 2005.
 Assesses the value that workforce development 
organizations add to their for-proﬁt partners
 Segmented by business sector 
B2PCommerce Corporation, Impact Manager.  
www.impactmgr.org/index.cfm
30 July 2004.
 Customized database software for tracking 
nonproﬁts’ performance; marketed to  
community foundations
 Promotes the software’s beneﬁts to funders, 
nonproﬁts, and government
 Apparently a relatively scalable “social MIS” 
and social reporting tool (in some ways similar to 
REDF’s OASIS)
The Center for What Works, Benchmarking  
Primer – 7 Steps, www.whatworks.org
20 June 2004.
 Appears to be aimed at smaller organizations 
that are considering benchmarking/measurement 
for the ﬁrst time
 Spends some time selling the ideas of 
performance measurement and benchmarking
 CfWW publishes newsletters and other such 
moves toward greater sharing of best practices
Innovation Network, Innonet.org,  
Technology Tools, www.innonet.org/tools 
20 January 2004.
 Organization has developed “Workstation 2.0” 
– an online tool/program that helps nonproﬁt 
organizations develop certain capacity-building 
tools; available for free; three basic modules:
 Organizational Assessment Tool
 Logic Model Builder
 Evaluation Plan Builder
  Organization also offers interactive educational 
tools, consulting services, and other evaluation-
oriented services
Earl, Sarah, et al, Outcome Mapping: Building 
Learning and Reﬂection into Development 
Programs, Ottawa, Canada: International 
Development Research Centre. 
www.idrc.ca/index_en.html
2 August 2004.
 Intended audience is in the international 
development sphere
 Outlines a forthcoming paper (and possibly a 
consulting product to follow)
 Acknowledges the difﬁculty of determining 
cause-effect relationships in measuring impact
 Advances a system of output/outcome 
measurement that assesses changes in client 
and partner behaviors and attitudes that can be 
traced more directly to a program’s operation
 Suggests that organizations work as partners 
and devise their performance measurement 
strategies together in a way that breaks down 
the outcomes/impact into smaller pieces that 
can be connected to the work of each partner 
organization
 Deﬁnes outcomes as: “changes in 
relationships, activities, actions, or behavior of 
boundary partners that can be logically linked 
to a program’s activities although they are not 
necessarily directly caused by it.”
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Kellogg Foundation, WK, Evaluation Handbook, 
January 1998. www.wkkf.org/Pubs/Tools/
Evaluation/Pub770.pdf
20 June 2004.
 Clearly focused on program evaluation 
undertaken by a Kellogg-funded organization
 A good primer for an organization pursuing its 
own independent or ﬁrst evaluation
 Worthwhile discussion of theories of 
measurement/evaluation
 Some good methodological guidance for 
pursuing own evaluation 
 Some burdensome detail
 Most discussion of evaluation does not directly 
drive towards simpler or scalable ‘metrics’
Kellogg Foundation, WK, Logic Model 
Development Guide, December 2001. 
www.wkkf.org/pubs/tools/evaluation/pub3669.pdf 
20 June 2004.
 Published after the WKKF Evaluation 
Handbook
 Begins and operates at the most basic level, 
assuming that the reader has no previous 
knowledge of logic models or theories of change
 Helpful division of logic models into categories 
for different purposes
 Includes basic exercises to teach readers to 
develop logic models
 A signiﬁcant portion of the paper explains how 
to convert a logic model into an evaluation tool
 Includes forms and templates for organizations 
to build their own models
Olsen, S and Nicholls, J, A Framework for 
Approaches to SROI, Prepublication draft dated 
March 2005, Presented at the Haas Social 
Metrics Conference. 
 Examines different measurement reg.imes 
across a spectrum of activities developed in the 
document’s SROI framework
 Establishes 10 key principles for an  
SROI regimes
 Useful for organizations that are establishing 
an SROI system – demonstrates the framework 
with examples of existing SROI systems
 Includes a timeline of SROI analysis and 
additional resources
Urban Institute, Key Steps in Outcome 
Management, May 2003,
www.urban.org/publications/310776.html
20 June 2004.
 Moderately detailed, process-oriented guide 
to setting up an evaluation system based on a 
simpliﬁed logic model
 Aimed at smaller or less sophisticated 
nonproﬁts
CDVCA Measuring Impacts Toolkit, The 
Community Development Venture Capital 
Alliance Return on Investment Project, New York: 
CDVCA, 2005.
 Presents methodology and examples of 
measuring and interpreting various outcome data 
generated by CDVC investments
 Offers suggestions for standardizing 
measurement data across different investments 
(so better comparisons might be made)
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